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RU 486 and the Politics of Drug
Regulation in the United States
and France
One of the most significant medical innovations of recent decades,1
RU 486, or Mifepristone as the drug is officially known, is a hormonal
compound that prevents the implantation of the embryo in the early
stages of pregnancy and thus induces abortion. 2 Medical experts have
found the drug to be a highly safe and effective method of terminating
an early pregnancy.3 While primarily used for abortion, RU 486 also
shows promise in the treatment of certain cancers and other serious dis-
eases.4 The French inventor of the drug, Etienne Emile Baulieu,
I. See generally Editorial Note, THE BIRTH CONTROL TRUST, THE ABORTION PILL:
WIDENING THE CHOICE FOR WOMEN (1989) (proceedings of a conference held on
October 26, 1989, at the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists,
London) [hereinafter WIDENING THE CHOICE]. Organizers of the conference deemed
RU 486 a "major medical breakthrough." Id. at 6. According to Malcolm Macnaugh-
ton of the University of Glasgow, a conference participant, "the development of [RU
486] is an advance in reproductive medicine of the same magnitude as the develop-
ment of the hormonal contraceptive pill." Id. at 5. David Grimes, a leading U.S.
researcher on RU 486, has called it "the most exciting new drug we've had on the
scene in a quarter of a century .... Early Nonsurgical Abortion Option if US. Approves
RU 486, OB. GYN. NEWS, Dec. 15, 1989, at 1. See also Thomas Maggio, Politics in the
Drug-Development Process: The Case of Mifespristone, 46 AM.J. Hosp. PHARM. 133 (1989);
Joseph Palca, The Pill of Choice?, SCIENCE, Sept. 22, 1989, at 1319. For medical litera-
ture on RU 486 as an abortifacient (an abortion-inducing agent), see infra note 21
and accompanying text. For medical literature on other significant medical uses of
RU 486, see infra note 4 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
4. This Note focuses on the use of RU 486 as an abortifacient. RU 486 has,
however, also been tested successfully for a number of other significant medical uses.
The drug has been tested for its potential to block hormones that cause breast cancer
tumors to grow. A French research group found that RU 486 halted cancer growth
to a limited extent in 12 of 22 breast cancer patients. RU 486: The Import Ban and Its
Effect on Medical Research: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities,
and Energy of the House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 74 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kathryn Horowitz). The drug may have wider
applicability in the fight against other cancers, such as those of the kidney and bow-
els. Sam Yen of the University of California at San Diego has reported that experi-
mental RU 486 use by 12 women resulted in greater than 50 percent reductions in
fibroid tumors of the uterus. Laurie Garrett, From Birth, Pill Was Controversial, NEws-
DAY, Dec. 4, 1991, at 22. It may also effectively treat viral infections, including, possi-
bly, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). See William Regelson et al.,
Beyond 'Abortion'. RU-486 and the Needs of the Crisis Constituency, 264J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1026-27 (1990). A National Institutes of Health study found the drug effective as a
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received the distinguished Lasker Award for his discovery.5 Advocates
for abortion rights have hailed the drug as providing an important non-
surgical option for women facing unwanted pregnancies. 6
In France, where the drug has been available since 1988, RU 486 is
now used in approximately one-third of legal abortions. 7 Britain's
Health Ministry recently approved the drug for use there.8 The drug is
also available in China, and may soon be available in the Netherlands
and in three Scandinavian countries. 9 The World Health Organization
is considering possible introduction of the drug into developing coun-
tries, where widespread unsafe surgical abortion practices are estimated
to kill approximately 200,000 women each year.' 0
At the same time, the drug is not legally available in the United
States, I where it is widely condemned by opponents of legal abortion.
treatment for Cushing's Syndrome-a serious and sometimes fatal condition caused
by an excess of glucocorticoids. See Hearing, supra, at 83. (statement of George P.
Chrousos, Senior Investigator and Section Chief, National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development, National Institutes of Health). Swedish scientists at the
Karolinska Institute are researching possible use of RU 486 as a once-a-month con-
traceptive pill. New Tests Set for 'Abortion Pill', MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 1990, at
BI.
5. Baulieu received the Albert Lasker Medical Research Award on September
27, 1989. The award is considered to be one of America's most prestigious medical
awards, often a "prelude" to the Nobel Prize. LAWRENCE LADER, Ru 486; THE PILL
THAT COULD END THE ABORTION WARS AND WHY AMERICAN WOMEN DON'T HAVE IT
42 (1991).
6. See ETIENNE-EMILE BAULIEU, THE 'ABORTION PILL' (1991); Rebecca J. Cook,
Antiprogestin Drugs: Medical and Legal Issues, 21 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 267 (1989); MICHAEL
KLrrSCH, ALAN GUTrMACHER INST., RU-486: THE SCIENCE AND THE POLITICS (1989)
[hereinafter ALAN GUTrMACHER INST. 1989]; LADER, supra note 5; Mindy J. Lees,
Note, I Want a New Drug: RU-486 and the Right to Choose, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1113
(1990); Sarah Ricks, Note, The New French Abortion Pill: The Moral Property of Women, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 76 (1988).
7. Gina Kolata, After Large Study of Abortion Pill, French Maker Considers Wider Sale,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1990, at B10.
8. LADER, supra note 5, at 17.
9. Id. Efforts to introduce RU 486 in Italy have run into resistance, particularly
from The Vatican, despite the advocacy of an Undersecretary of Health, Elena
Marinucci. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 117. In 1990 Baulieu received the first "Minerva
Prize" ever awarded to a foreigner from the Italian women's organization, Club delle
Donne. Id. Opinion has been divided on the introduction of the drug in Germany,
where there has been resistance to its introduction, but where a ranking federal
health official praised RU 486 as a necessary alternative to surgical abortion. Id. at
119. Health officials in the former USSR expressed interest in bringing the drug to
that country, id., as have officials in Spain, id. at 116, Hungary, id. at 121, Austria, id.
at 119, India, id. at 122, and Japan, id. at 123.
10. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 15. For every woman who dies, an estimated 20 to
30 suffer infections, uterine perforations, and injuries leading to sterility. Id. The
drug was hailed as an "essential therapeutic advance" with great potential for use in
developing countries by Dr. Joseph Spiedel, the president of the Population Crisis
Committee, an organization that researches international population issues. Edward
Cody, French Delay Marketing of Abortion Pill, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1988, at 1.
11. On July 1, 1992, a pregnant American woman, Leona Benten, attempted to
import RU 486 from Britain for use in the United States under a law allowing for
importation for personal use of some drugs approved in other countries, but not the
United States. The drug was confiscated upon Benten's arrival to the United States.
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Its critics label RU 486 a "death pill" 1 2 and have threatened to boycott
pharmaceutical companies that market the drug. 13 The drug's French
manufacturer, Roussel-Uclaff, has stated that it has no current plans to
apply to the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for a
license to market the drug in the United States. 14 The reasons for the
French company's refusal to market the drug in the United States, how-
ever, extend beyond the threat of boycotts.
This Note will focus on the political, legal, and regulatory dynamics
underlying the contrasting stories of the availability of RU 486 in France
and its non-availability in the United States. This Note suggests that the
crucial difference in the two pictures is that the French government
through active governmental intervention in the pharmaceutical market
has insulated the issue of drug availability and public health from polit-
ical and religious views on abortion, whereas the U.S. government has
not. A central reason Roussel-Uclaf remains reluctant to apply for a
U.S. license to market RU 486 is concern over the neutrality of the fed-
eral drug regulatory system given early indications of the agency's nega-
tive view on the drug, the agency's great discretionary authority, and,
perhaps most importantly, the anti-abortion stance of the Bush
Administration.
This Note argues that the U.S. government should take notice of
the French government's effort to ensure that scientific and public
health concerns are not dominated by the political and moral contro-
versy surrounding abortion. While underlying political and economic
differences render the specific market interventionist approach of the
French government inappropriate in the United States, the French gov-
ernment's goal of promoting scientific neutrality can and should be
incorporated into U.S. drug regulatory policy. While abortion is a divi-
sive political issue in the United States, the contentious moral debate
should not impact the health of the women and men who could be bene-
fited by RU 486.
Part I of this Note focuses on the use, safety and desirability of the
drug, primarily from a medical perspective, but also from the perspec-
tive of its critics. Part II addresses the French approval of RU 486 and
steps taken by the French government to promote the availability of the
drug in the interest of women's health. In addition, Part II examines
Philip J. Hilts, Abortion Pills Are Confiscated by U.S. Agency, N.Y. TiMEs, July 2, 1992, at
A12.
Benten challenged the confiscation of the drug in federal court. Benten v. Kessler,
1992 WL 166263 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). See infra Section III B.4 for further discussion of
the Benten case.
12. 134 CONG. REc. E 1972 (daily ed.June 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
Representative Robert K. Dornan is a leading congressional opponent of the drug.
13. Felicity Barringer, They Keep the Abortion Protest Alive, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 23,
1991, at A16. See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
14. LADER, supra note 5, at 132-33. The company has stated that RU 486 will not
be introduced in the United States unless the U.S. government requests an applica-
tion from the company. Id. at 132.
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how the French government was able to separate public health concerns
from official state abortion policy as well as from religious and other
public sentiment on the abortion issue. Part III focuses on the contrast-
ing situation in the United States, where the FDA presents significant
obstacles to the drug's introduction. The agency's broad discretion over
new drug decisions and apparent susceptibility to political pressure
from anti-abortion lobbying have played significant roles in Roussel-
Uclaf's decision not to seek U.S. licensing of RU 486. Part III then
argues that the FDA's preliminary appraisal of the drug, which banned
personal importation, should be interpreted as arbitrary and capricious
by a reviewing court.
Part IV of this Note suggests that the United States adapt the
French government's concerns about scientific neutrality and public
health to the U.S. context by changing its drug regulatory policy. The
RU 486 case illustrates that current FDA policy inadequately ensures
that the agency will carry out its mandate to protect the public health.
The suggested changes would clarify the agency's role in drug approval
and eliminate some of the broad areas of agency discretion that are so
susceptible to political abuse. This Note suggests that further statutory
and regulatory guidelines as well as new agency powers are needed to
assure the neutrality of these procedures and to ensure that U.S. con-
sumers are not denied access to an important drug due to the political
biases of a federal agency. While these proposals would help ensure fair
agency consideration for RU 486, an impartial FDA would have a wider
public health impact through improving consumer access to other
important, but politically controversial, treatments.
I. RU 486: The Drug and the Debate
A. Medical Background on RU 486
The name "RU 486" derives from the name of the French company
marketing the drug, Roussel-Uclaf. The drug, a steriod hormone similar
in structure to the natural hormone progesterone, 15 interferes with a
woman's body's natural production of progesterone, which is essential
for the maintenance of pregnancy. 16 By blocking formation of proges-
terone, RU 486 prevents implantation of the fertilized egg into the uter-
ine wall in the first weeks of pregnancy and leads to a series of
physiological changes whereby the uterus expels its contents.' 7
Clinical trials of RU 486 established that it most effectively ensures
complete expulsion of the contents of the uterus when used in conjunc-
15. David T. Baird, What It Is, How It Works and Its Development, in WIDENING THE
CHOICE, supra note 1, at 12.
16. Id.
17. See ALAN GUTrMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at 3.
It is believed that by halting progesterone's normal activities, RU 486 has two
important direct effects: first, it induces menstrual bleeding and the slough-
ing off of the uterine lining, a key element to its success as an abortifacient; in
addition, the drug is thought to reverse progesterone's calming influence on
Vol. 25
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tion with a second drug, a prostaglandin compound, which causes the
uterus to contract. 18 Approval of RU 486 by the French Ministry of
Health provided that the drug only be available in conjunction with a
prostaglandin. 19 Approval of the drug also provided that the drug be
administered by doctors in clinics or hospitals and required two follow-
up visits by the patient, the first for the administration of the pros-
taglandin and the second to confirm that the abortion was completed.
20
RU 486 combined with a prostaglandin provides a safe and effective
method of terminating pregnancies of eight or fewer weeks gestational
length. 2 ' The most comprehensive study of the combination of the
drugs (the Silvestre study), conducted with 2,115 French women, con-
cluded that it is as safe and effective as surgical abortion-the most com-
mon method of abortion. 22 The study found that in ninety-six percent
of the cases, the drug successfully induced abortion with no serious side
effects. 23 After taking the two drugs, women experienced the equivalent
of a heavy menstrual period, lasting an average of about nine days.
24
Minimal side effects included "transient abdominal pain" caused by the
the muscular uterine walls and make the uterus more excitable, leading to
contractions that help to dislodge the embryo. (footnote omitted).
However, scientists have yet to identify conclusively the exact chain of events that
causes RU 486 to induce abortion. Id.
18. Peter Coles, French Government Approves Abortion Pillfor Commercial Use, NATURE,
Oct. 6, 1988, at 486.
19. Id.
20. Id.
2 1. See Lars Birgerson & Viveca Odlind, Early Pregnancy Termination with Antiproges-
tins: A Comparative Clinical Study of RU 486 Given in Two Dose Regimens and Epostane, 48
FERTILITY & STERILrrY 565 (1987); M. Bygdeman & M. L. Swahn, Progesterone Receptor
Blockage: Effect on Uterine Contractility and Early Pregnancy, 32 CONTRACEPTION 45
(1985); L. T. Cameron & D. T. Baird, Early Pregnancy Termination: A Comparison between
Vaccuum Aspiration and Medical Abortion Using Prostaglandin or the Antiprogestogen RU 486,
95 BRIT.J. OBSTETRrICS & GYNAECOLOGY 271 (1988); Beatrice Couzinet et al., Termina-
tion of Early Pregnancy by the Progesterone Antagonist RU 486 (Mifepristone), 315 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1565 (1986); Mary W. Rodger & David T. Baird, Induction of Therapeutic Abor-
tion in Early Pregnancy with Mifepristone in Combination with Prostaglandin Pessary, THE
LANCET, Dec.19, 1987, at 1418; Andr6 Ulmann, Uses of RU 486for Contragestion: An
Update, 36 CONTRACEPTION 27 (1989); Harry A. M. Vervest & Mary A. Haspels, Prelim-
inary Results with the Antiprogestational Compound RU-486 (Mifepristone) for Interruption of
Early Pregancy, 44 FERTILITY & STERILITY 627 (1985).
22. Louise Silvestre et al., Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy with Mifepristone ( RU
486) and a Prostaglandin Analogue, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 645, 648 (1990).
23. Id. at 646. Roussel-Uclaf has made an unofficial report of its findings of a
98.5% effectivness rate of the drug used in 38,000 cases. Kolata, supra note 7, at B10.
The French procedure for clinical use of RU 486 has made provision for the event
of the drug's failure. Before taking RU 486, French women sign an "informed con-
sent document," which explains the potential for failure of the drug. The Informed
Consent Document Used in France for RU 486, reprinted in ALAN GUTrMACHER INST.
1989, supra note 6, at 8. The document states that in the event of a failure, "at [the
woman's] request and under effective medical supervision" a surgical abortion will
be performed. Id. The document also requires the woman to agree that if during the
course of the RU 486 procedure she wishes to discontinue the treatment and carry
the pregnancy to term, she has been "clearly warned that [she and her child] may be
susceptible to risks, notably malformation of the fetus or the child." Id.
24. Silvestre, supra note 22, at 646.
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prostaglandin. 25 Only one woman in the study experienced side effects
requiring significant medical treatment. 2 6
In April 1991, the French government announced the first death
associated with the use of RU 486. A 31-year old woman, with a history
of heavy smoking, died of a heart attack after receiving Nalador, a type
of ingestible prostaglandin. 27 The woman had eleven children and was
in her thirteenth pregnancy. Following this announcement, the French
government banned the use of RU 486 in women who are over thirty-
five or who are "regular smokers," which the government defines as
women who have smoked more than ten cigarettes a day for more than
two years. 28 In response, officials of Roussel-Uclaf announced that RU
486 would be administered with Gemeproste, a synthetic prostaglandin
considered to be safer than Nalador. 29
Studies confirm that RU 486 is effective only through about the
eighth week of pregnancy. The Silvestre study was limited to women
who were within forty-nine days of their last menstrual period.30 Stud-
ies also have found that the drug is less effective in terminating
pregnancies past the seventh or eighth week of gestation since after this
time period implantation of the embryo has already been aided by the
natural production of progesterone. 3 1 Nevertheless, scientific research
continues to explore the potential usefulness of the drug in aborting
pregnancies beyond the eighth week. 32
Since its legalization in France in late 1988, RU 486 has become
increasingly popular and has been used by about 80,000 women. 33 Sci-
entific analyses of the drug project no long-term effects on fertility or
any other long-term negative health effects.3 4 Some scientific uncer-
tainty remains at this stage, however, given the relatively recent intro-
duction of the drug in France.
B. RU 486 Compared to Surgical Abortion Methods
The preferred surgical method for carrying out first trimester abortions
in France, in the U.S. and in other countries, is vacuum aspiration of the
uterus (also known as suction curettage). With approximately 1.6 mil-
lion abortions performed annually by this method, it is one of the most
common surgical procedures in the U.S.3 5 Vacuum aspiration is also
25. Id. at 646-47.
26. Id. at 646.
27. Joyce Price, Death Hurts Abortion Pill's Chances, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at
A5.
28. Robin Herman, French Ban Use of RU 486 By Smokers, Women over 35, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 1991, at 25.
29. Price, supra note 27, at A5.
30. Silvestre, supra note 22, at 645.
31. Couzinet et al., supra note 21, at 1567.
32. Id.
33. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 18.
34. See supra note 21.
35. ALAN GUTTMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at 11.
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considered among the safest surgical procedures, with relatively low risk
of side effects or complications. 3 6 When side effects occur, they include
hemorrhaging, accidental perforation or laceration of the cervix, as well
as a higher risk of reproductive tract infection. These complications
often can be treated, but may, in the rare case, lead to sterility.
3 7
RU 486 eliminates these risks of invasive surgery as well as the sig-
nificant discomfort often associated with the dilation of the cervix that is
required for surgicial abortion. While surgical abortions generally
require a local anaesthesia, RU 486 does not and thus avoids the health
risks associated with anaesthesia.3 8
Another advantage to the use of RU 486 is its usefulness in the very
early stages of pregnancy, before a surgical abortion may be medically
advisable. 39 In addition, the RU 486 method is less expensive than its
surgical counterpart. While the average cost of a surgical abortion in
the U.S. is $213,40 the RU 486 procedure in France costs the patient the
equivalent of $80.41
While generally considered as safe as surgical abortion, RU 486's
greatest advantage may be more psychological than medical. According
to David Grimes of the University of Southern California, a leading U.S.
researcher, patients who have had prior surgical abortions say that their
experience with RU 486 was less traumatic than with the surgical abor-
tion.42 Experts suggest that the relative privacy of the process, in which
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 13.
40. ALAN GU-rrMACHER INST., Facts in Brief. Abortion in the United States 2 (1990)
[hereinafter ALAN GurrMACHER INST., Facts in Brie]. This figure represents the aver-
age amount paid in 1986. Costs are slightly higher today. Id.
41. Steven Greenhouse, Fears Confine Abortion Pill to France, N.Y. TiNIES, Mar. 26,
1989, at 18. RU 486's low cost may increase options for poor women, who since
Congress' passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1977, have not received Medicaid
funding for abortions unless their lives are in danger. In 1987, 12% of abortions
performed in the United States were paid for with state funds. ALAN GuTrMACHER
INST., Facts in Brief, supra note 40, at 2. As of August 1990, 13 states used their own
funds to pay for abortions. Id. When public funds are unavailable for abortion, 20%
of Medicaid-eligible women who want to have an abortion carry their pregnancies to
term. Id.
42. Abortion Pill Less Traumatic Than Surgery, Study Suggests, Gannett News Service,
Sept. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, GNS File. As part of a larger study,
Grimes studied the emotional responses of 16 recipients of RU 486. Grimes admin-
istered the drug to all 16 women, half of whom who were past due for periods but not
pregnant, allowing him to test the effects of the drug on women who do not know
they are pregnant. Id. All of the women in the study had similar cramping, bleeding
and other side effects whether pregnant or not. Id. Grimes reports that the results
"were much comparable to a heavy menstrual period" and said that all of the women
in the study "said they would choose the drug again if needed." Id.
In an interview, Elizabeth Aubeny, director of a French abortion clinic, stated that,
"From a psychological point of view, women seem very happy with the method.
They take the pill themselves, they have hospital supervision, but they're not subject
to physical manipulation at the hands of strangers." Alan Riding, Abortion Politics Are
Said to Hinder Use of French Pill, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1990, at 1. Aubeny has reported
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a woman takes the drug in a clinical setting but experiences the drug's
effects in private, contribute to the comparative lack of trauma of the
experience. 4 3
Family planning experts maintain that RU 486 potentially may pro-
vide even greater privacy advantages to women. While surgical abor-
tions are performed only in specialized clinics or hospitals, RU 486,
theoretically, can be administered in any family planning clinic or doc-
tor's office. At a time when picketing outside abortion facilities is com-
monplace in some communities, the relative anonymity and privacy
afforded by the RU 486 method is considered a significant advantage
over the surgical method.4 4
The relative privacy offered by RU 486 should not be overstated,
however. A scenario whereby women have access to the drug outside a
supervised clinical setting may pose severe health and safety conse-
quences. If the drug falls into the hands of a woman who is in a late
stage of pregnancy, or if the drug is not used in conjunction with pros-
taglandin, RU 486 could cause great harm and would, at a minimum, be
ineffective. Medical reports uniformly agree that RU 486 should be
used only under the careful supervision of a physician. 4 5
C. Opposition to RU 486
The aspects of RU 486 that potentially make it a more desirable alterna-
tive to a surgical abortion have sparked opposition from groups
opposed to any form of legal abortion. Opponents of the drug fear that
reducing the physical, psychological and fiscal costs of abortion will
increase the likelihood that women will seek the procedure. 4 6 Anti-
abortion groups have actively opposed the drug in France and Great
Britain.4 7 Since availability of the drug was first announced in France,
U.S. opponents of abortion have perhaps been most vocal in their oppo-
that 80% of women who tried both methods prefer RU 486. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at
94.
43. ALAN GUrrMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at 11. The drawn-out length of
the RU 486 procedure may be a psychological disadvantage for some women. Terry
Gilbert, Pill Induces Abortion Hangover, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 14, 1990, at FI. In an
interview, French Family Planning Association officer Marie-France Coulet said that
the length of the RU 486 process has proven to be a drawback for some women in
France, particularly when they were trying to hide the pregnancy from family mem-
bers. The majority of the women surveyed by Coulet's organization, however, were
satisfied with the procedure. Id.
44. LADER, supra note 5, at 20-21.
45. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 91-92.
46. 134 CONG. REc. E 1972 (daily ed.June 14, 1988) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
Doman stated: "The proponents of abortion want to replace the guilt suffered by
women who undergo abortion with the moral uncertainty of self-deception. Imagine,
with the death pill, the taking of a preborn life will be as easy and as trivial as taking
aspirin." Id.
47. Opponents of the drug have held rallies outside the headquarters of Roussel-
Uclaf in Paris. Steven Greenhouse, A New Pill, A Fierce Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12,
1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 23. See also BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 38-39, 113.
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sition to the drug.4 8 The president of the National Right to Life Com-
mittee, John C. Willke, leads the U.S. movement against the drug, which
he has described as a "human pesticide," and has stated that his organi-
zation would lead a boycott of Hoechts, Roussel-Uclaf's German parent
company if the drug is introduced in the United States.4 9 Willke com-
pares the drug to thalidomide, a sedative widely prescribed in the early
1960s to pregnant women, which led to serious birth defects. 50 Right to
life groups also draw attention to the fact that Hoechts produced poi-
sonous gas for use in German concentration camps during World War
11.51 Willke states that in marketing RU 486, the company now engages
in "chemical warfare on the unborn." 5 2 When the American Medical
Association passed a resolution supporting U.S. testing of the drug,
Willke claimed that the physicians involved were supporting the "killing
of their little patients."5 3
H. RU 486 in France
A. Comparison of French and American Drug Regulatory Systems
The French and American drug regulatory systems operate under the
same basic premise: a federal agency approves the marketing of new
drugs after examining clinical data submitted by the applicant pharma-
ceutical company. 5 4 In the United States, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, a division of the Department of Health and Human Services,
approves individual companies' licensing applications. The agency
responsible for review of drug registration applications in France is the
Direction de la Pharmacie et du Medicament (DPHM) of the Ministry of
Health, operating under the statutory mandate of the Public Health
Code.55 Both agencies employ the conventional four-phased drug
clinical experimentation model,5 6 under which the agencies conduct
limited monitoring of the applicant's data at the early phases of clinical
research and make final licensing decisions at the end of phase III.
48. See Elaine Bingham, The Curse of RU 486: The Death Pill, 6 LOMA LINDA U.
CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIoETHIcs UPDATE 4 (May 1990).
49. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 126.
50. Tala Skari, The Abortion Pill, LIFE, July 1990, at 72.
51. Bingham, supra note 48, at 4.
52. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 35-36.
53. AMA Endorses Controversial Abortion Pill, AP, June 28, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, AP File [hereinafter AMA Endorsement].
54. The pharmaceutical companies in both countries are thus primarily responsi-
ble for conducting the clinical trials and assembling data. The French government
does play a minor role, however, in the data assembly process. In France, pharma-
ceutical law provides for an "expert" in the assembling of the data-a scientist hired
to conduct the clinical trials and assess the results. The Ministry of Health provides
pharmaceutical companies with a list of government-approved experts from which
companies may choose based on the type of drug and the qualifications of the various
experts. See LEIGH HANCHER, REGULATING FOR COMPETITION: GOVERNMENT, LAW AND
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE (1990).
55. CODE DE LA SANTf- PUBLIQUE, art. L. 601, R. 5114-5117 (Fr.).
56. See infra notes 132-138 and accompanying text.
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One distinction between the two systems is the significant role that
an outside advisory committee plays in French drug regulatory
decisions. While the Minister of Health retains ultimate authority in
licensing decisions, it places great emphasis upon the advisory recom-
mendations of the twenty-eight-member Commission D'Authorisation
de Mise sur le Marche des Medicaments (Commission on Marketing
Authorizations), which has a statutory role in the consideration of all
licensing applications. 57 The membership of the Commission is drawn
largely from the medical profession, but also includes industry and con-
sumer representatives. This advisory committee plays a larger role in
approving new drugs than does its U.S. counterpart because, while the
FDA has discretion to rely on the recommendations of outside advisory
committees, these committees have no statutory role in the drug
approval process.58
B. French Approval of RU 486
The French Ministry of Health approved RU 486 on September 23,
1988, after Roussel-Uclaf conducted six years of clinical study of the
drug. The Ministry also approved strict protective conditions for distri-
bution of RU 486 in regulations subsequently enacted into law. 59 Each
package of the drug receives a specific number to track its distribution
and use.60 Distribution is limited solely to the public and private hospi-
tals and clinics authorized to perform abortions.6 1 Ministry of Health
regulations also require that the name of the physician or other official
in charge of the authorized medical facility be recorded in an official
registry.6 2
Regulations governing the distribution of RU 486 also require that
the drug be taken in conjunction with a prostaglandin, which is adminis-
tered two days after the initial dose of three 200 mg tablets of RU 486.63
The regulations further mandate that the drug only be given during the
first forty-nine days of pregnancy, which is defined as fifty days since the
last menstrual period or twenty-one days since the missed period for
women with twenty-eight-day cycles.6 French abortion law currently
requires a seven-day waiting period after a woman's initial visit to a doc-
tor to request an abortion.6 5 Thus, counting this initial visit, the two
visits required for the administration of the drug and the prostaglandin,
57. CODE DE LA SANTr PUBLIQUE, art. R. 5140-5141 (Fr.).
58. Section IV.C.3.b. of this Note discusses the role of outside advisory comittees
in the United States. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
59. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 92.
60. Cook, supra note 6, at 268.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. ALAN GuTrMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at 9.
64. AMA Endorsement, supra note 53.
65. Law No. 75-17 of 17 January 1975 concerning the voluntary termination of
pregnancy (Fr.), art. L. 162-5, (J.O., 18January 1975, No. 15, at 739-41), translated in
26 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 351, 353 (1975) [hereinafter French Abortion Law].
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and the follow-up visit, the entire RU 486 abortion procedure requires
four visits to the doctor's office.
In practice, French hospitals and clinics take great protective meas-
ures to ensure that the drug does not become available on the black
market. Physicians are particularly concerned that women might
unknowingly take the drug during later stages of pregnancy when it
would be neither safe nor effective, or take it without the necessary fol-
low-up prostaglandin. The drug is "kept under lock and key" in clinics
to ensure that it is not taken out of the clinic and transferred to other
hands. 66
C. Government Orders Production of Drug
On October 25, 1988, Roussel-Uclaf announced it would suspend distri-
bution of RU 486 in France.67 As its reason, the company's press
release cited "French and foreign public opinion and the controversy
raised by the possibility of using the antihormone Mifepristone (RU
486) to voluntarily interrupt pregnancy." '68 Press reports state that
company executives and their families received threats after the drug
was approved for the French market. 6 9 Other reports state that the
major reason for the company's action was a threat by the U.S. Right to
Life Committee, a leading anti-abortion group, to lead an international
boycott of products manufactured by Hoechts. 70
The company's decision was criticized two days later by a group of
over 1,000 doctors attending the World Conference of Gynecology and
Obstetrics in Rio dejaneiro. The physicians signed a petition criticizing
"the decision of Roussel-UCLAF to suspend the distribution of RU 486
(Mifepristone) in view of the recent approval of RU 486 as safe and
effective by the drug regulatory authorities of the governments of China
and France." 7 1 The petition also urged the French government "to
ensure that women have access to the benefits of scientific progress." 72
On October 28, 1988, Claude Evin, the Minister of Health, met with
officials of Roussel-Uclaf and threatened to invoke a French patent law
allowing the Ministry to transfer a drug patent to another holder if the
original holder does not market the drug.7 3 In addition, the French
government may have used some of its ownership rights in the company
66. Gilbert, supra note 43.
67. Cook, supra note 6, at 268. The company halted distribution by formally with-
drawing its application for a license for the drug. BAULIEU, supra note 6, at 40.
68. Roussel-Uclaf press release, Oct. 25, 1988, quoted in Cook, supra note 6, at 268
(footnote omitted).
69. Peter Coles, Volte Face on Controversial French Abortion Pill, NATURE, Nov. 3,
1988, at 4.
70. LADER, supra note 5, at 49.
71. Petition from the XIIth Congress of Gynecology and Obstetrics, Rio de
Janeiro, Oct. 27, 1988, quoted in Cook, supra note 6, at 268.
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. ALAN GUTTMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at I (footnote omitted).
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to exert pressure on it to resume marketing of the drug.74 Premier
Michel Rocard allegedly approved of the Minister of Health's actions
during this period.75
Shortly after the government's action, Roussel-Uclaf resumed mar-
keting the drug.76 At the time of the government's action, market ana-
lysts speculated that the company had sought the government's "order"
to manufacture the drug so that it would not appear responsible for
marketing the drug.7 7 Roussel-Uclaf denied such allegations.78
The Minister of Health's stated goal in pressuring Roussel-Uclaf to
continue marketing the drug was that RU 486 was critical to the public
health of women. 79 He also said, in a comment often cited by support-
ers of the drug, that RU 486 had become the "moral property of
women." 80 The Minister's comments and his government's advocacy
for RU 486 are somewhat surprising given the restrictive nature of
French abortion law. The following section of this Note will focus on
the restrictions on abortion in France against which the Minister's
actions appear incongruous.
D. French Abortion Law
France legalized abortion by statute in 1975.81 Since the nineteenth
century, French law had criminalized abortion, implicitly reflecting the
societal notion that a woman owed a childbearing duty to her husband,
her family, and the state.8 2 The Catholic Church historically buttressed
the pro-family policy in France.8 3 The policy received additional sup-
port after World War I from those who feared depopulation.8 4 In 1920,
a statute even banned any public discussion or writing about abortion or
contraception.8 5 In 1923, the law imposed a penalty of up to five years
imprisonment on those who performed abortions and up to two years
for women who had abortions.8 6 In 1939, a law entitled "The Decree
Law relative to the family and French natality" incorporated the laws of
1920 and 1923.87 Later amendments allowed for an abortion if it were
74. The French government owns a minority 36% stock in the company. LADER,
supra note 5, at 51-52.
75. Rone Tempest, France Orders Company to Distribute Abortion Pill, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1988, at 1.
76. Susan Sachs, Behind the Abortion Pill Turnaround, NEWSDAY, Oct. 31, 1988, at 13.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Abigail Trafford, Medical Moralism, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 1988, at Z24.
80. Edward Cody, France Orders Sale of New Pill, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1988, at Al.
The French Minister of Health, Claude Evin, stated, "I consider that if this progress
existed, it had become the moral property of women, and that it was therefore my
responsibility to say so to Roussel-Uclaf." Id.
81. French Abortion Law, supra note 65.
82. See DOROTHY M. STETSON, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN FRANcE 53 (1987).
83. Id. at 53.
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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required to save a mother's life, but still required doctors "to report all
diagnoses of pregnancy to the government."8 8
The French government vigorously pursued this pro-family policy
until the late 1960s and early 1970s when the abortion reform move-
ment gained momentum.8 9 The 1975 law legalizing abortion in France
represents an important historical shift, but still limits women's access to
abortion in several significant ways and is considered to be more restric-
tive than abortion laws in other European countries and the United
States.90 The law's preamble expressly retains the pro-family policy of
the past. The first section of the law explicitly "guarantees the respect
of every human being from the commencement of life." 9' It goes on to
state that "[t]here shall be no derogation from this principle except in
cases of necessity and under the conditions laid down by this Law."' 92 A
1979 amendment stated that "[ilt shall be a national duty to teach this
principle [respect for human life] and to provide education concerning
responsibility, the acceptance of the child into society and family
policy."9 3
The pro-family tenor of the preamble finds expression in the indi-
vidual provisions of the act. The 1975 law legalized abortions up to the
tenth week of pregnancy for any woman "whose condition places her in
a situation of distress." 94 While the statute designates the woman seek-
ing the abortion to be the judge of whether her distress sufficiently mer-
its abortion, 95 the law also requires mandatory counseling of the woman
seeking the abortion by the clinic or hospital. 96 A 1979 amendment
added that counseling "shall consist of a private interview during which
the woman shall be provided with assistance and advice appropriate to
her situation, as well as the necessary means to resolve the social
problems posed, particularly in order to enable her to keep her child." '9 7
88. Id. at 56-57.
89. Id. at 59.
90. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw (1989).
Glendon offers the view that French abortion law is more restrictive than the law in
other European countries and in the United States. But see Jane M. Cohen, Comparison
Shopping in the Marketplace of Rights, 98 YALE Lj. 1235 (1989) (book review). Cohen
criticizes the Glendon thesis, suggesting that French abortion law is less restrictive
than that of the United States to the extent that abortions in France are generally
publicly-funded, while those in the United States are not. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text. A 1982 amendment to French abortion law included abortion on
the list of medical acts reimbursible by the system of free state medical insurance.
Under the system, 70%o of the cost of abortions are paid for by the state, with the
state paying for 100% of the cost of medically necessary abortions. See GLENDON,
supra, at 17.
91. French Abortion Law, supra note 65, Title I, § 1.
92. Id.
93. Law No. 79-1204 of31 December 1979 on the voluntary termination of preg-
nancy U.O., Edition des Lois et Dcrets, 1 Jan. 1980, No. 1, at 3-4), translated in 31
INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 505 (1980).
94. French Abortion Law, supra note 65, at Art. L. 162-1.
95. Id. at Art. L. 162-4.
96. Id.
97. Law No. 79-1204, supra note 93, at Art. 162-4.
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The law also mandates that the woman be provided with "names and
addresses of persons who, either individually or on behalf of an institu-
tion ...are able to provide women and couples facing the problems
associated with acceptance of the child with moral or financial
assistance." 9 8
In a fairly significant restriction of women's access to abortion, the
law also requires a week long waiting period between the time a woman
requests an abortion and the time she receives one. 99 This "thinking
period" embodies a legislative unease with abortion that is also mani-
fested by the law's requirement that abortions only be performed in offi-
cially approved hospitals and clinics and that the number of abortions
performed in these establishments "not be greater than one-quarter of
all surgical and obstetrical operations performed." 1° ° A first violation
of this provision leads to closure of the establishment for a year; a sec-
ond violation leads to permanent closure.' 0 ' French law also restricts
access to abortion for unmarried minors by requiring that one parent
consent to a minor's abortion.' 0 2
The 1975 law also significantly restricts access to abortion after ten
weeks of pregnancy. After the tenth week of pregnancy, "therapeutic"
abortions only are allowed if two physicians certify that continuation of
the pregnancy is "seriously endangering the woman's health or that
there is a strong possibility that the unborn child is suffering from a
particularly serious disease or condition considered as incurable at the
time of the diagnoses."' 10 3
98. Id.
99. French Abortion Law, supra note 65, at Art. L. 162-5. In the U.S. case, City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983), the
Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance containing, among other restrictions on
abortion, a mandatory 24-hour waiting period between the time a woman signed a
consent form and the time she could receive an abortion. The waiting period provi-
sion of Akron was overruled, however, by the Supreme Court in a 1992 case, which
upheld a Pennsylvania law containing a mandatory 24-hour waiting period between
provision of information for informed consent and performance of an abortion.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
100. French Abortion Law, supra note 65, at Art. L. 178-1.
101. Id.
102. Id. at Art. L. 162-7.
103. Id. at Art. L. 162-12. In the United States, constitutional law prevents states
from placing any restrictions on a woman's access to abortion during the first trimes-
ter. U.S. law, however, does permit states to regulate abortion during the second
trimester, but "only to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preser-
vation and protection of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
The constitutionality of restrictions on abortion in the United States is currently in a
state of flux, however, after the Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), which found that a state may be able to impose
restrictions on a woman's access to abortion during the first trimester. Casey, decided
in the 1992 term, upheld, in addition to the 24-hour waiting period, an "informed
consent" provision of the Pennsylvania law requiring that a woman seeking an abor-
tion be provided with information regarding the nature of the procedure, the health
risks of abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. The
Court did not uphold the provision of the law requiring a married woman to obtain
the consent of her husband before obtaining an abortion. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
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E. Public Health and the Introduction of RU 486 in France
Against the backdrop of French abortion law, the French government's
advocacy for RU 486 appears incongruous. While French abortion pol-
icy tends to discourage abortion as an option for women facing
unwanted pregnancies, the government's support of RU 486 may make
abortion a more viable option for many French women. In its action,
the Ministry of Health was able to separate public health from politics.
The Health Minister supported RU 486 as an important public health
advance, putting aside the pro-family implications of French abortion
law as well as the historical and present day controversy surrounding
abortion in French society.
The government's action appears less incongruous when viewed in
light of other recent, controversial, examples of public health activism
by the French government. Foremost recently is the government's sig-
nificant role in promoting the use of contraceptives. Shortly after Prime
Minister Francoise Mitterand's government came to power in 1981, the
Council of Ministers adopted a wide-scale campaign to encourage con-
traceptive use.10 4 Since 1974, contraceptives have been distributed free
at government-supported family planning clinics, with costs reimbursed
by the national health system.10 5 Nevertheless, organizers of the 1981
campaign believed that a general societal ignorance about contraception
contributed to high abortion rates.1 0 6 A 1977 study estimated that only
thirty-two percent of French women used a modern contraceptive
method. 10 7 In the first year of the campaign, the governnment opened
1,000 centers for contraceptive information.' 0 8 In addition, the success-
ful campaign included extensive television advertising aimed at encour-
aging public discussion and providing information on the availability of
contraceptives.' 0 9
The French government's activism on behalf of RU 486 may also be
understood as part of a recent effort by the Ministry of Health to
encourage the early availability in France of important new pharmaceuti-
(1992). Future cases, now pending in lower courts, are expected to test further state
law restrictions on abortion.
104. STETSON, supra note 82, at 68.
105. Id. at 60.
106. Id. at 68. A 1977 study indicated that the government was providing insuf-
ficent services in the area of family planning. 377 contraceptive information centers
provided information to 13 million women of child bearing age. Id. at 67.
107. Id. at 68. "The incidence of use was much lower among the young
farmwomen, workers, and immigrants." Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The campaign was successful in a number of ways. Physicians responded
to the campaign's efforts to facilitate the use of contraceptives. "Whereas in 1965,
only four percent of doctors had helped ... by the mid 1980s, only five percent of
French physicians refused to prescribe modern contraceptive methods to patients."
Id. at 69. The campaign had an effect on the public. InJuly 1982, a poll revealed that
75% of women and 79% of men approved of the government's policy on contracep-
tives. Id. InJanuary 1984, support had increased to over 80% among both men and
women. Id.
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cals. A 1981 law created a national drug development committee to
bring government officials and officials of pharmaceutical companies
together to share information about new drugs that might have impor-
tant public health effects.I 1 0 Through the Committee, the government
can better monitor the research of drug companies and encourage the
marketing of certain drugs that might provide public health advantages.
While the availability of RU 486 does not stem from the action of the
drug development committee, both the committee's and the Minister of
Health's actions in supporting RU 486 exemplify a similar linking of
pharmaceutical policy and public health concerns.
HI. Obstacles to the Introduction of RU 486 in the United States
Roussel-Uclaf has stated on a number of occasions that it has no plans to
apply to the FDA for a license to market RU 486 in the United States. I I
The company's reason for not applying for a U.S. license appears largely
based on economic concerns, such as the threat of boycotts by anti-abor-
tion groups and liability. Nevertheless, it is obvious that any economic
loss that Roussel-Uclaf would incur by marketing the drug would be off-
set to some extent by income from the large potential market for RU
486 in the United States, both as an abortifacient, and for other medical
purposes. Consequently, another more significant reason may lie
behind the company's refusal to market the drug in the United States-
the politics of U.S. drug regulation. This section of the Note argues that
both the structure of decision-making at the FDA and the anti-abortion
politics of the Bush Administration present significant obstacles to the
drug's approval in this country. The possibility that FDA decisions are
dominated by political rather than health concerns has, in fact, already
been demonstrated in the agency's initial appraisal of the drug, which
this section argues should be viewed as an arbitrary and capricious exer-
cise of agency power.
A. Economics of Roussel-Uclaf's Decision
1. Threat of Product Boycott
Roussel-Uclaf's decision not to seek an FDA license for RU 486 has
been significantly influenced by the threat of an international boycott of
the products of its parent company, Hoechts. Anti-abortion groups
have repeatedly stated that they will implement a boycott if Roussel-
Uclaf applies for FDA approval. 12
There is good reason to believe that these groups will continue to
oppose the introduction of RU 486 in the United States because the
110. Order of 7 April 1981 establishing the Committee on New Drug Develop-
ment (J.O., Edition des Lois et Dcrets, 20 May 1981, Supp. Issue No. 118, at 4870),
translated in 32 INr'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 794 (1981).
111. RU 486 Falling Victim to Presidential Politics, ABORTION REPORT, Feb. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABTRPT File.
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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drug could have dramatic effects on the efforts of the U.S. anti-abortion
movement. The groups believe RU 486 could potentially make abor-
tions easier for women to obtain. 1 13 In addition, the potential for the
administration of RU 486 in any doctor's office would reduce the
groups' ability to focus their anti-abortion efforts on abortion clinics.
Political commentators have also speculated that RU 486 could affect
anti-abortion groups' public support because the drug enables women
to abort pregancies earlier than surgical abortions, and public opinion
favors earlier rather than later abortions. 114 For example, some abor-
tion opponents have generated public support with pictures of fetuses in
late stages of development. When RU 486 is administered, however, the
fetus is estimated to be less than 3/4 of an inch long.11 5
In the past, U.S. anti-abortion groups have used boycotts with some
degree of success. In the mid 1980s, the National Right to Life Commit-
tee staged a boycott of Upjohn products as a result of Upjohn's market-
ing of FDA-approved prostaglandins, used to induce late abortions in
hospitals.1 6 Although Upjohn did not withdraw the products from the
market as a result of the boycott, in 1985 it stopped further research on
abortion-inducing drugs. Upjohn did not blame its decision on anti-
abortion lobbying, but rather on the "litigious climate" and the
"adverse regulatory climate in the United States."' 17 These reasons, as
they relate to Roussel-Uclaf's decision to market RU 486, will be dis-
cussed in the two subsequent sections of this Note.
2. Liability Concerns
Upjohn's reference to the "litigious climate" as a component of its deci-
sion not to further research abortion drugs is often cited as a reason for
the dramatic drop in research into new contraceptive methods in this
country.1 8 Commentators have cited liability concerns as a reason for
Roussel-Uclaf's reluctance to attempt to market RU 486 in the United
States." 9
In the early 1970s, thirteen companies worldwide, eight of them
American, were active in researching contraceptive methods. 120 Today,
only one American pharmaceutical company (Ortho) and two outside
113. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
114. See Dorothy Wickendon, Drug of Choice, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1990, at 26.
115. Id.
116. Gina Kolata, Boycott Threat Blocking Sale of Abortion-Inducing Drug, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1988, at Al.
117. Id.
118. See DEVELOPING NEW CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES (L.
Mastroianni, Jr. et al. eds., 1990); Lisa Kaeser, Contraceptive Development: Why the
Snail's Pace?, 22 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 131, 133 (May/June 1990); Richard Lincoln &
Lisa Kaeser, Whatever Happened to the Contraceptive Revolution?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS.
20, 22 (Jan./Feb. 1988).
119. See ALAN GtTITMACHER INST. 1989, supra note 6, at 13; Cook, supra note 6, at
270.
120. Lincoln & Kaeser, supra note 118, at 20.
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the United States remain active in the area.1 2 1 A well-publicized large
jury award against Ortho for a faulty spermicide may have contributed
to this decline in research in the contraceptive area. 122 In addition,
pharmaceutical companies have had difficulty obtaining insurance poli-
cies to cover marketed contraceptives in the wake of lawsuits that
stemmed from the marketing of the Dalkon shield, an intrauterine
device that increased the risk of pelvic infection. 123
The role that liability concerns have played in Roussel-Uclaf's deci-
sion not to seek FDA approval of RU 486 must, however, also be consid-
ered in light of the safety record of RU 486. The drug has been proven
highly safe in international clinical trials and in use in France, 12 4 and
there is evidence that the drug may have advantages over surgical abor-
tions. 125 While long-term consequences of the use of RU 486 have yet
to be identified due to its relatively recent introduction in France and
other countries, current medical opinion does not forsee any long-term
effect on fertility or other problems resulting from use of the drug as a
temporary progesterone blocker. 12
6
3. Potential Market for RU 486
The attractiveness of the potential market for RU 486 in the United
States should somewhat offset Roussel-Uclaf's concern about the threat
of economic boycott and potential liability. The United States has one
of the highest abortion rates in the developed world: approximately 1.6
million abortions were performed in the United States in 1988.127 RU
486 is most effective in approximately the first seven to eight weeks of
pregancy and is currently used in one-third of the 250,000 abortions
that occur each year in France.' 28 In the United States, a similar or
larger number of women might be eligible for RU 486-induced abor-
tions, given that fifteen percent of abortions in this country currently
take place at eight weeks or less.' 29 This number does not represent the
cap on potential usage, however. Pregnant women might seek medical
attention sooner than they currently do, if RU 486 succeeded in reduc-
ing the fears often associated with a surgical abortion. Consequently,
more women might be eligible to use RU 486, thereby increasing the
121. Id.
122. The award was made in the case of Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788
F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986).
123. Lincoln & Kaeser, supra note 118, at 22.
124. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 21.
127. ALAN GuTrMACHER INST., Facts in Brief, supra note 40, at 1. The abortion rate
in the United States is 28 per 1000 women aged 15-44. The equivalent numbers for
other countries are: Canada: 10.2; Great Britain: 14.2; Denmark: 18.3; and Swe-
den: 19.8. Stanley K. Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A World Review 1990, 22 FAM. PLAN.
PERSPS. 76, 78 (Mar./Apr. 1990).
128. Kolata, supra note 7.
129. ALAN GUTrrMACHER INST., Facts in Brief, supra note 40, at 2. It is difficult to
estimate, however, how many of these women would choose the RU 486 method.
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market for the drug. Consideration of the potential market for RU 486
must also include the strong possibility that the drug will have other
medical uses. ' 3 0
B. Politics Behind the Company's Decision
While economic considerations militate both for and against Roussel-
Uclaf's seeking to market RU 486 in the United States, political consid-
erations work against such a decision. Roussel-Uclaf officials indicate
that President Bush's public stance against abortion and the anti-abor-
tion legislation enacted during the Reagan and Bush administrations
have influenced the company's decision not to market the drug in the
United States.13 1 This section will argue that the company is justified in
fearing the role that politics could play in the FDA's handling of an RU
486 application.
The long, complicated drug approval policy provides the FDA with
significant discretion over new drug applications. This discretion may
easily be invoked against a drug application for non-scientific reasons.
In fact, the agency has already used its discretion to ban personal impor-
tation of RU 486 apparently in response to political and moral rather
than scientific objection to the drug. This section will analyze the FDA's
discretion in new drug applications and the influence on the agency by
anti-abortion sentiment within the Bush administration. Finally, this
section will consider how the FDA responded to political pressure in its
preliminary appraisal of RU 486.
1. Discretion and the FDA New Drug Approval Process
The degree of discretion the FDA has over the lengthy new drug proce-
dure and the breadth of its statutory mandate permit politics to play a
role in an FDA decision to approve a new drug application. The length
and complexity of the process alone gives the agency significant discre-
tion to slow or halt a drug's movement through the system.
The first step of the process requires the drug's sponsor, usually a
pharmaceutical company, to file an investigational new drug application
(IND) with the agency.13 2 The sponsor must include information indi-
cating that the drug is reasonably safe for clinical testing in humans. t 33
The award of an IND license exempts the drug from the prohibition on
movement of unapproved drugs through interstate commerce.1 34
If the IND license is granted, the sponsor begins clinical testing of
the drug in four phases. Phase I of the process involves limited clinical
130. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 150-56 and 193-94 and accompanying text.
132. 21 C.F.R. § 312.40(a)(1) (1991). See also Hearing, supra note 4, at 153-54
(statement of Ronald Chesemore, FDA Associate Commissioner for Regulatory
Affairs).
133. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 154 (statement of Ronald Chesemore).
134. The FDA has 30 days to decide whether to grant or reject the IND license. 21
C.F.R. § 312.402(b)(1) (1991).
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testing of the drug on small groups of individuals ranging from twenty
to eighty patients and primarily focuses on safety of the drug for human
use.13 5 During Phase II of the process, in larger clinical trials of several
hundred patients, researchers collect evidence of efficacy and additional
safety data.' 3 6 Phase III studies focus on the effect of the drug in large
controlled and uncontrolled trials ranging from several hundred to
thousands of patients.13 7 During this phase, which can range from three
to five years, researchers must collect evidence of safety and efficacy to
support market approval. Following Phase III testing, a sponsor must
file with the FDA a new drug application (NDA) showing the results and
analyses of the clinical data.' 3 8
The locus of the agency's power and discretion lies in its broad
standard for the approval of new drugs. Under the Food Drug and Cos-
metic Act, the statutory standard is "substantial evidence" of the drug's
safety and efficacy. l3 9 This standard is vague and gives the agency
broad authority over new drug decisions and thus over public health.
The Act's definition of "substantial evidence" does not lend any greater
clarity to the standard, calling only for:
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations.... by
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use,
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed
labeling thereof. 14 0
Given the number of potential risks inherent in any drug intended
for human consumption, the FDA's great veto power over any new drug
under its broad "safe and effective" standard is immediately apparent.
According to one critic of the FDA's standard for new drug approval:
a statutory change that can be read as being essentially absolute poses
profound difficulties when applied to biological and medical judgments
which are rarely absolute. In assessing any new drug or in any proposed
course of clinical experimentation, it is almost always possible to raise just
one more bona fide scientific objection relevant to safety, which finite
experimentation has failed to fully satisfy.l 4 1
135. Id. § 312.21(a).
136. Id. § 312.21(b).
137. Id. § 312.21(c).
138. The agency has six months under the regulations to respond to the applica-
tion, but this is often extended by agreement between the sponsor and the agency.
21 C.F.R. § 314.100 (1991).
139. New drugs must meet this standard of safety and efficacy to be approved for
marketing under 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). This standard was added to the Act through an
amendment in 1962. The significance of the 1962 amendments to the Act will be
discussed in Section IV of this Note. See infra notes 202-06.
140. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988).
141. Gerald D. Laubach, Federal Regulation and Pharmaceutical Innovation, in REGU-
LATING HEALTH CARE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL 60, 66 (Arthur Levin ed., 1980).
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Considerable critical commentary has focused on the breadth of the
agency's standard and the high degree of discretion it gives the agency
over drug regulatory decisions. Much of the commentary argues that
FDA discretion, the uncertainty that pharmaceutical companies have
about the standard, and the length of the U.S. drug regulatory process
have led to a significant drop in U.S. pharmaceutical innovation. Critics
argue that these factors have led to a "drug lag," whereby the United
States trails foreign countries in the development of pharmaceuticals.1 42
One leading critic of the "drug lag" argues that FDA policy has
caused the United States to fall behind Britain and Germany in the
introduction of new drugs. According to this commentator, "the lag
with Europe is not confined to drugs with little or modest medical gain
but also includes drugs the FDA itself ranks as significant therapeutic
advances... [and] there is evidence... that regulation has been a major
factor contributing to this lag." 143
The loosely defined statutory standard for FDA acceptance of
clinical studies give the agency enormous power. The statutory test
requires that studies be "adequate and well controlled."'144 Under this
standard, the agency presumably could reject almost any given scientific
study.
The agency also exerts great control over the use of foreign clinical
test data to support new drug applications. FDA regulations allow for
foreign test data to be submitted in support of NDAs. 14 5 But the stan-
dard by which the FDA accepts or rejects foreign test data is vague, in
keeping with its other NDA standards, and allows the agency almost
complete discretion. According to the regulations, "[i]n general, FDA
accepts such studies provided they are well designed, well conducted,
performed by qualified investigators, and conducted in accordance with
ethical principles acceptable to the world community."' 14 6 While the
agency has explicit requirements for ethical conduct of trials, its regula-
tions do not elaborate on the scientific or clinical requirements for "well
designed, well conducted trials."' 4 7
The lengthy FDA drug approval process operates under vague Con-
gressional mandates and regulations that do not significantly clarify the
agency's role in the process. This lack of clarity lends itself to abuse of
142. See HENRY B. GRABOWSKI, DRUG REGULATION AND INNOVATION (1976); THE
INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES: IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. REGULATORY REFORM
(Robert B. Helms ed., 1980); Lewis A. Scheindlin, Note, New Drug Approval: Lannett,
the Drug Lag, and the NDA System, 11 RuT.-CAM. LJ. 231 (1980).
143. Henry B. Grabowski, Regulation and the International Diffusion of Pharmaceuticals,
in THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES, supra note 142, at 36.
144. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a) (1991).
146. Id.
147. The regulation requires that the foreign country adhere to the ethical
requirements of the "Declaration of Helsinki" or their own ethical standards. It also
states that "if the foreign country's standards were used, the sponsor shall explain in
detail how those standards differ from the 'Declaration of Helsinki' and how they
offer greater protection." 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c) (1991).
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power by agency scientists and officials. In fact, potential for abuse was
noted by an official agency review panel. 148 As a result, the agency has
developed detailed conflict of interest rules and rules about contact
between scientists and pharmaceutical companies, aimed primarly at
concerns that companies will exert influence over the approval
process.14 9
2. Politics and the Agency
The role of political pressure in FDA decisions, whether from Congress,
the public, or the Executive Branch, which oversees the agency, has not
been the subject of much critical attention. Nevertheless, the same
vague mandates and high level of discretion afforded to expert "scien-
tific" decisions by the agency would seem to make the agency suscepti-
ble to political pressure. In the case of RU 486, pressure is likely to be
exerted on the agency due to the strong anti-abortion stance of the Bush
Administration.
The Administration in general and President Bush in particular
have actively supported the effort to overturn the U.S. Supreme Court
decision legalizing abortion, Roe v. Wade. 150 The Administration has
also supported a law enacted during the Reagan years that cut off funds
to international family planning organizations that support abortion.' 5 '
In addition, the Bush administration has backed the provisions of the
Public Health Service Act that prohibit federally-funded family planning
groups from performing abortions or providing information on abor-
tion to pregnant women. 152 During its most recent term, Congress
passed legislation overruling this so-called "gag rule" but was unable to
win the votes necessary to override President Bush's veto. 153
There have been signs that the Bush Administration is particularly
concerned that RU 486 may be introduced in the United States. During
148. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG
REGULATION 39 (1977).
149. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 19-19.55.
150. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In the cases of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA v. Robert P. Casey, the Justice Department filed
Amicus Briefs on behalf of Petitioners urging the Court to overturn Roe v. Wade.
Bush has stated that he is opposed to abortion "except when the life of the mother is
threatened or when there is rape or incest." Robert Pear, GOP Faces Fight on Abortion
Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1992, at A15. All Republican party platforms since 1980
have called for a Constitutional amendment to protect "unborn children" and urged
the appointment of anti-abortion judges. Id.
151. 22 U.S.C. § 216b(f)(1)-(2) (1982).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (1992).
153. Philip J. Hilts, Easing of Abortion Curb Is Disputed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1992, at
A 18. The Administration announced in March 1992 that its rule forbidding abortion
counselling in 4000 government-funded family planning clinics did not apply to doc-
tors, but only to counselors and nurses. Id. Legal experts and medical organizations
have challenged this interpretation, arguing that the rule makes no distinction
between doctors and other professionals and that the Administration's interpretation
carries no legal weight. Anti-abortion groups are expected to challenge an effort to
exempt doctors from the rules. Id.
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the fall 1990 Congressional session, President Bush threatened to veto a
bill reauthorizing the Public Health Service Act for reasons including
concerns that federal research funds would be used to investigate RU
486.154 Ultimately, concerns over whether the bill would permit fund-
ing of abortion-related scientific research prevented the bill from mak-
ing it off the Senate floor.' 5 5
Thus, there is strong evidence that RU 486 will face political oppo-
sition from the Bush Administration and its supporters in Congress
when and if the FDA reviews an application for the drug. 15 6 The FDA's
broad statutory mandate and the absence of significant review gives the
agency tremendous discretion over new drug licenses-discretion that
could easily mask decisions based on political pressure. Not surpris-
ingly, these factors have played a significant role in Roussel-Uclaf's deci-
sion not to apply to the FDA for a new drug license. Moreover, the
company's fear of political influence upon the FDA have already proven
accurate by the FDA's initial appraisal of RU 486.
3. FDA Import Ban
It is unclear how the FDA would respond to a new drug application for
the marketing of RU 486. The agency already has shown itself to be
susceptible to political pressure on the issue of RU 486. In its prelimi-
nary appraisal of RU 486, the agency banned personal importation of
154. CONG. Q., Sept. 29, 1990, at 3124. At issue was the Senate version of the
Public Health Service reauthorization bill, S. 110, § 6(B)(3)(b) cited in 136 CONG. REC.
S13,675 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990), which allocated grants to "public and private enti-
ties" to "promote the development, evaluation, and bringing to the marketplace of
new and improved contraceptive devices, drugs, and methods." Debate on the Sen-
ate floor included concerns that the provision could effectively lift the ban on federal
funding for research on abortifacients. Senator Coats argued that research on RU
486 might be funded under the proposed provision, despite the fact that "RU 486 is
not simply a contraceptive, and research into its modes of operation is not simply the
promotion of conception .... It can and does induce abortion." 136 CONG. REC.
S13,943 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Coats).
155. 136 Cong. Rec. S13,943 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Coats).
There was also significant opposition from abortion opponents to the "Chafee
amendment" to the Act, which would have allowed federally-funded family planning
groups to engage in "non-directive" abortion counseling. See 136 CONG. REC.
S13,940 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990).
156. Federal agencies are generally susceptible to political influence from the
Executive Department through Presidential appointment and Executive oversight of
administrative rulemaking. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 461-75 (1979); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson,
Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1410 (1975).
In recent years, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has
taken on an increasingly significant role in the oversight of agency rulemaking. In
1987, the OMB was a chief architect of new FDA rules amending the drug approval
provisions of the FACA. See Kathleen M. O'Connor, Note, OMB Involvement in FDA
Drug Regulations: Regulating the Regulators, 38 CAT. U. L. REV. 175, 186 (1988). OMB
involvement in FDA regulations has focused primarily on furthering the Reagan/
Bush Administration's goal of deregulation. The OMB's access to the FDA raises the
potential of the OMB influencing the FDA to further the Administration's policies on
abortion.
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the drug.' 57
Since July 1988, the FDA has allowed individuals to import unap-
proved foreign drugs into the United States in limited quantities. This
"personal importation" policy, which has never been the subject of for-
mal regulation,' 5 8 was unveiled at an AIDS conference and is widely
viewed as an attempt by the agency to diffuse controversy surrounding
its reportedly slow approval of new AIDS drugs.15 9 The policy has since
enabled people with AIDS to obtain some non-FDA-approved drugs
from abroad. 160
The personal importation policy has been most heavily utilized by
persons with life-threatening diseases and diseases for which no effective
treatment currently exists. However, the FDA importation policy is not
limited to those purposes. The policy, set out in the FDA's Regulatory
Procedures Manual, allows the FDA to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether a given drug may be imported under the policy.' 6 ' According
to the manual, "FDA personnel may use their discretion to examine the
background, risk, and purpose of the products before making a final
decision."' 162 The manual also provides that:
in deciding whether to exercise discretion to allow personal shipments of
drug (sic) or devices, FDA personnel should consider a more permissive
policy in the following situations: when the intended use is appropriately
identified, such use is not for treatment of a serious condition, and the
product is not known to represent a serious health risk; or when 1) the
intended use is unapproved and for a serious condition for which effective
treatment may not be available domestically either through commercial
or clinical means; 2) there is no known commercialization or promotion
to persons residing in the U.S. by those involved in the distribution of the
product at issue; 3) the product is considered not to represent an unrea-
sonable risk; and 4) the individual seeking to import the product affirms
in writing that it is for the patient's own use (generally not more than 3
month supply) and provides the name and address of the doctor licensed
157. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPORT BULLETIN #66-B13 "RU 486" (1988)
[hereinafter IMPORT BULLETIN]; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPORT ALERT #66-47
AUTOMATIC DETENTION OF ABORTIFACIENT DRUGS (1989) [hereinafter IMPORT ALERT].
158. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, CH. 9-71,
COVERAGE ON PERSONAL IMPORTATIONS (1989) [hereinafter MANUAL].
159. What's News-FDA Now Formally Allows Personal-Use Drug Imports, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 1988, at Al.
160. A non-profit organization, People with AIDS Health Group, runs an import
service under the aegis of the personal importation policy for people with AIDS, and
imports promising drugs that are unavailable in the United States from England and
Germany. Gina Kolata, Company Devised AIDS Drug Test Partly as Sales Tool, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at B9. In addition to people with AIDS, individuals with
Alzheimer's Disease have made use of the importation policy to obtain access to
experimental Alzheimers drugs available in Canada and Mexico, but not the United
States. Punishing Alzheimers Patients, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 1989, at 14 (Editorial).
161. MANUAL, supra note 158, at RPM 9-71-20. Importations are policed by cus-
toms officials who report questionable foreign pharmaceutical products imported in
personal baggage or more often in mailed packages, to district FDA offices. See Hear-
ing, supra note 4, at 151 (statement of Ronald Chesemore).
162. MANUAL, supra note 158, at RPM 9-71-30.
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in the U.S. responsible for his or her treatment with the product or pro-
vides evidence that the product is for the continuation of a treatment
begun in a foreign country. 163
In September 1988, three days after RU 486 was approved by the
French government for use in French abortion clinics, the drug was spe-
cifically excluded from the personal importation policy by an FDA bulle-
tin. 16 4 On June 6, 1989, the FDA issued a formal "import alert" in
which it clarified its position on importation of RU 486, stating that "the
intended use of such drugs could pose a risk to the safety of the
user." 165 At a Congressional hearing held on the subject of the RU 486
import ban in November 1990, an FDA official explained why the FDA
had placed the ban on the drug. Ronald Chesemore, FDA Associate
Commissioner of Regulatory Affairs, testified that the agency took the
action "because as an abortifacient, RU 486 is not proposed for treat-
ment of a serious condition for which no alternative treatment
exists." 166 In addition, Chesemore testified, "[n]or could the Agency
conclude that RU 486 and the prostaglandins, as they might be used,
posed no significant health risks."'
167
The Congressional hearing uncovered evidence that the FDA's
action was not based on health and safety concerns but was a highly
political response to active lobbying by anti-abortion members of Con-
gress in the weeks preceding the imposition of the ban. According to
the testimony of the Committee chairman, the FDA file upon which the
import ban was based contains "no records of injuries due to the drug,
... no records of a black market, foreign or domestic .... and no record
that there has been any attempt to import the drug into the United
States."' 168 In addition, the ban was imposed despite the stringent con-
trols placed on the drug's availability in France, which make taking the
drug outside supervised clinical settings illegal, and make it virtually
impossible for anyone to smuggle the drug out of the country.'
6 9
163. Id.
164. IMPORT BULLETIN, supra note 157.
165. IMPORT ALERT, supra note 157.
166. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 159 (statement of Ronald Chesemore).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Ron Wyden). The following interchange took
place at the hearing on RU 486 between Committee Chairman Wyden and FDA
Commissioner Chesemore:
Wyden: At the time of the issuance of the import alert, did the FDA have any
evidence that a black market was developing on RU 486 in the United States?
Chesemore: I do not believe we had any concrete evidence. We were con-
cerned that the possibility could exist.
Wyden: At the time of the import alert, did the FDA have any evidence of
surreptitious entry of RU 486 in the United States?
Chesemore: We did not.
169. The following interchange took place at the hearing when Rep. Wyden ques-
tioned FDA Commissioner Chesemore on the subject of the restrictions placed on
RU 486's availability in France:
Wyden: But how were people going to get it except under these tightly con-
trolled circumstances that Roussel-Uclaf has established? The most charita-
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While FDA files on the import ban do not contain scientific evi-
dence that may have prompted the agency to clarify its position on RU
486 in June 1989, they do reveal evidence of political lobbying by oppo-
nents of abortion. The evidence includes an inquiry about the agency's
policy on the drug in April 1989 by Senator Jesse Helms, a chief Con-
gressional opponent of abortion, and a letter addressing the subject of
an import ban by eleven anti-abortion House members. 170 Also in the
file was a letter dated June 9 from the then FDA Commissioner Frank
Young, who publicly opposed abortion.'17 This letter responded to one
Congressman with a statement of the FDA's policy on the drug.'
72
At the Congressional hearing critics accused the FDA of placing
politics above public health considerations. As one medical witness tes-
tified: "There was an obvious political decision and not a scientific one,
and it puts in question the rationality of the FDA's review."1 7 3 The next
section of this Note will examine the rationality of the FDA's ban on
personal importation of RU 486 from a legal perspective.
4. Ban as Arbitrary and Capricious
The legality of the import ban on RU 486 has recently been tested. On
July 1, 1992, a pregnant American woman, Leona Benten, attempted to
import the drug into the United States from Britain under the FDA per-
sonal use exception. She alerted customs authorities of her intent, and
was met atJohn F. Kennedy International Airport in New York by repre-
sentatives of the FDA and customs officers who seized the drug from
her. Benten later said that she had attempted the importation in order
ble thing I can say about your policy is it is overkill because nobody is going
to be able to do this anyway. The company tightly restricts it. You gathered
no evidence that would suggest that the company or individuals were not
complying with it.
Chesemore: Because the product was unapproved in this country, we had no
evidence of what might happen in this company, Mr. Chairman. We certainly
were aware of the tight controls that were in existence in France.
Wyden: If you had looked, you would have found that the only way you can
get it is under tightly controlled circumstances. This great fear that you had
couldn't materialize because the drug couldn't get out that way.
170. Hearing, supra note 4, at 43. Chairman Wyden's testimony also included the
following:
Let us turn to what is in the FDA file. For the most part, it is filled with letters
and correspondence from anti-abortion activists and their allies in Congress.
These communications are remarkable both for their character and their tim-
ing. It would seem when certain folks pressed FDA's button, the FDA was
only happy to respond quickly. For example, only 19 days elapsed between
one particular high-level congressional demand on FDA to stop personal
importation of the drug and the RU-486 import ban. This certainly has to be
a new land-speed record for an agency response to congressional inquiries.
Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Rep. Wyden).
171. SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 20, 1990, at A3.
172. Hearing, supra note 4, at 63 (Memorandum prepared by Small Business Sub-
committee staff).
173. Hearing, supra note 4, at 66 (statement of William Regelson, Professor of
Medicine, Medical College of Virginia).
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to test the validity of the import ban in court. 174
Benten challenged the seizure of the drug in federal court, alleging
that the ban on personal importation was illegally promulgated by the
FDA. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
entered a preliminary injunction in Benten's favor, ordering the return
of the drug to her.' 75 The District Court held that the import ban was
an "arbitrary and capricious" exercise of FDA power, in violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and was not based on valid fac-
tual evidence.' 76 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stayed the injunction pending appeal and Benten filed an application
with the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the stay. 177 The Supreme Court
denied the application, holding that Benten had failed to demonstrate
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim for return of the drug. 17 8
Even if the Supreme Court had found that the ban was illegally
promulgated, such a ruling would likely have little practical effect on
American women's access to RU 486, however, as the FDA would likely
then reissue the ban legally, with a relevant scientific basis, such as fears
that personal importation would lead to uncontrolled personal use of
the drug.179 In addition, the agency might find that RU 486 can not be
legally exported from France under French law.' 8 0 Although the FDA
could thus rewrite its import ban so that it would withstand judicial scru-
tiny, challenges to the current ban like that brought by Benten are still
regarded as useful by advocates of RU 486 because they bring attention
to the FDA's record on the drug and the Agency's general susceptibility
to political pressure with regard to the abortion issue.
This Note supports the position adopted by the Eastern District,
rather than that of the Supreme Court, in light of the political maneu-
vering and absence of scientific inquiry surrounding the adoption of the
import ban by the FDA. The Eastern District, in its decision to grant
Benten a preliminary injunction, did not, unfortunately, provide suffi-
cient analysis of the ban to support its finding that the FDA acted ille-
gally. This discussion is intended to fill some of the gaps in the District
Court's opinion, and aid future challengers of the ban.
174. Philip J. Hilts, Abortion Pills Are Confiscated by U.S. Agents, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2,
1992, at A12.
175. Benten v. Kessler, 1992 WL 166263 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
176. Id. at 7-8.
177. Benten v. Kessler, 112 S. Ct. 2929 (1992) (syllabus).
178. Id. at 2930.
179. This is a valid concern given the potential dangers of self-administration with-
out prostaglandin. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. This Note does not
advocate uncontrolled personal importation of RU 486 into the United States.
Importation of the drug in such a manner could have a disastrous impact on the
health of women. This analysis does, however, support lifting of the import ban with
restrictions. Under such a scenario, a woman could be allowed to import RU 486 and
prostaglandin, for use under close medical supervision. This will be further dis-
cussed in Section IV of this Note.
180. See Coles, supra note 18.
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The Eastern District Court held that the import ban was arbitrary
and capricious agency action, but did not elaborate on this finding. The
court did, however, identify the correct standard of review, as the appro-
priate standard of review for informal agency action under the APA is
the arbitrary and capricious standard.' 8 ' Under this standard, as
defined by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volp, a
reviewing court must engage in a two-part inquiry.' 8 2 It must first
determine whether the decision-maker acted within the scope of his or
her statutory authority as prescribed by the governing statute. Then the
court must determine whether the actual choice made was "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 8 3 Under the latter test, a court "must consider whether the deci-
sion was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment."' 18 4
Under the first part of the two-step Overton Park inquiry, it is likely
that a court would find that the FDA acted within the scope of its statu-
tory authority in issuing the import ban. The Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act gives the FDA the authority to regulate the importation of drugs that
are not approved for use in the United States.' 8 5
It is the second part of the Overton Park test that the RU 486 import
ban fails. In reviewing FDA regulations in Almay, Inc. v. Califano,18 6 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, described the second part of
the Overton Park standard as requiring "an inquiry into the facts and a
determination of whether [the] decision was (1) based on 'a considera-
tion of the relevant factors' and (2) free of such error as would deprive
it of a rational basis."'18 7 In Almay, the court held that FDA regulations
governing hypoallergenic cosmetics were arbitrary and capricious under
the Overton Park standard because the agency's findings were based
solely on a dictionary definition, a report from the American Medical
Association, and unreliable survey data.18 8
Given the FDA's apparent lack of health and safety data on RU 486,
a reviewing court following the Almay reasoning should find that the
import ban was not based on a consideration of the relevant scientific
181. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988).
182. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). In Overton Park, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision
by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to route a highway through a
public park. Courts often apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review enun-
ciated in the case to informal notice and comment rulemaking. However, courts also
apply the standard to other types of informal agency actions, such as the Secretary of
Transportation's park placement decision in Overton Park. STEPHEN BREYER & Ricn-
ARD STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 619 (1985).
183. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 414.
184. Id. at 416.
185. 21 U.S.C 381(a) (1988).
186. 569 F.2d 674 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
187. Id. at 681.
188. Id. at 682.
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factors.' 89 Additionally, the FDA did not appear to consider its own
guidelines on the appropriateness of import bans. According to the
guidelines, FDA personnel are to "recommend ... the issuance of an
import alert if they encounter: personal importation of products that
represent either a direct or an indirect risk; the promotion of unap-
proved foreign products for mail-order shipment; or repeated importa-
tion of products that represent a health fraud." 190 The FDA's action
against RU 486, made without evidence of personal importation or
threat of importation, seems to contravene the agency's own guidelines
for the appropriateness of import bans. The ban was apparently issued
purely for a symbolic purpose. A reviewing court would consider
whether the FDA's apparent failure to follow its own guidelines consti-
tuted a failure to consider a "relevant factor" under Overton Park. In
addition, a reviewing court would likely find that the agency's apparent
heavy reliance on political considerations was not a "relevant factor."
In reviewing the ban, a court would, however, have to be mindful of
the great degree of discretion the Supreme Court has traditionally
granted the FDA in making decisions about drug availability. As the
Court stated in a case in which it upheld an FDA determination of a new
drug application, "[e]valuation of conflicting reports as to the reputa-
tion of drugs among experts in the field is not a matter well left to a
court without chemical or medical background."' 19 1
Assuming that a court held the FDA's action to be arbitrary and
capricious as applied to a particular complainant, the FDA would most
likely issue a second import ban based on more "relevant factors" such
as documentary evidence regarding dangers of uncontrolled personal
use of the drug. The agency could also construe or revise its guidelines
to give it greater discretion in preventing importation of the drug, argu-
ing that RU 486-as an abortifacient-is not intended for treatment of a
"serious condition." As the policy is currently drafted, it is so discre-
tionary that it provides almost no constraints on the FDA's ability to
stop the importation of a particular drug.
While overturning the import ban would likely lead to the FDA's
reissuing the ban on a different basis, continued challenges to the cur-
rent ban are useful for a number of reasons. Challenges such as the one
brought by Leona Benten bring public attention to the agency's suscep-
tibility to political influence on the abortion issue. Perhaps the attention
will make the agency wary of succumbing to such bias in the future, both
out of fear of judicial review and of loss of public confidence. Chal-
lenges to the ban also send the message to drug companies that the
FDA's decision-making process is not going unchecked and that politics
does not have a rightful place in U.S. drug regulation. As the next sec-
189. It is possible that the FDA has already recreated its RU 486 file to reflect
concerns expressed during the hearing about the lack of scientific basis for the
import ban.
190. MANUAL, supra note 158, at 9-71-40.
191. Weinberger v. Bentex Phamaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973).
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tion of this Note will discuss, the import ban has sent the opposite signal
to Roussel-Uclaf and other drug companies that might want to license
RU 486 or other controversial products.
5. The Company's Reaction to the Politics of the FDA
While Roussel-Uclaf has not publicly stated it as such, the import ban is
widely said to have confirmed the company's fears that U.S. regulators
have taken a negative view of RU 486 and are highly susceptible to lob-
bying from abortion opponents.1 9 2 The politics of the FDA, in combi-
nation with the Bush Administration's anti-abortion stance, is a top
concern of the company as it contemplates future marketing of its prod-
uct.' 9 3 While the company has begun plans to market the drug in Brit-
ain, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands, the head of international
marketing at Roussel-Uclaf has stated that "selling in the United States
is out of the question at the moment."' 9 4
The drug's inventor told a U.S. audience in February 1992 that
Roussel-Uclaf would "delay a decision to seek approval for the drug
pending the outcome of the U.S. presidential election."' 9 5 Baulieu
stated that RU 486 is being held "hostage" to American politics, and
added, "I sincerely hope that after the election-if a Democrat or
George Bush is elected-he will follow the rule that if there is a good
drug, one should let doctors and patients have it. ' l196
There have been other consequences of the import ban. According
to the Congressional hearing on RU 486, since the imposition of the
import ban, Roussel-Uclaf has in many cases stopped supplying RU 486
to U.S. researchers who are investigating other uses of the drug. '9 7 The
decline in the supply of the drug in the United States has been inter-
preted as a business decision by the company to use its drug supply only
in countries where approval of the drug is imminent.198 As a member of
192. Hearing, supra note 4, (statement of Rep. Wyden).
193. Id.
194. Alan Riding, Abortion Politics Are Said to Hinder Use of French Pill, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 1990, at Al.
195. ABORTION REPORT, supra note I11.
196. Id.
197. Scientists conducting studies on other uses of RU 486 testified at the congres-
sional hearing that the import ban had negatively affected their access to the drug.
Kathryn Horowitz, a University of Colorado breast cancer specialist, testified that she
was told by the FDA that she could no longer receive the drug in the mail from the
manufacturer, nor could she travel to France and import the drug back into the
United States. House Subcommittee Hearing on RU 486, ABORTION REPORT, Nov. 20,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABRPT File. George Chrousus, a National
Institute of Health researcher, testified that the atmosphere surrounding the import
ban led to Roussel-Uclaf's reluctance to supply the drug for government-sanctioned
study under an officially filed investigational new drug applications. Maura Reynolds,
US. Ban on Abortion Pill Said to Hurt Research on Cancer, Other Dread Diseases, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1990, at A23. An FDA official testified that the import ban did not extend to
samples for testing under an approved application, and that the FDA was mistaken
when it informed researchers otherwise. Id.
198. See Hearing, supra note 4, at 3 (statement of Rep. Wyden).
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Congress testified at the oversight hearing: "[t]he drug's manufacturer
has made a business decision only to use its supplies in countries where
government regulators will give them a fair shake."1 9 9
The next section addresses what is perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the FDA's handling of RU 486, the agency's abdication of its
statutory public health role. By allowing political considerations to
dominate drug decision-making, the agency is ignoring its dual public
health role of keeping ineffective and dangerous drugs off the market
while promoting the availability of safe and effective new medicines.
IV. FDA Decisionmaking and Public Health
Prior sections of this Note have described the effect of FDA discretion
and abortion politics on the availability of RU 486 in the United States.
This section will turn to what is perhaps the heart of the issue-how the
FDA's past and probable future bias against RU 486 rejects the agency's
statutory role as protector of public health. By allowing politics to dom-
inate health considerations in its appraisal of a drug's safety and efficacy,
the FDA has abdicated its dual public health role-to screen out danger-
ous drugs from the U.S. market and to ensure that safe and useful drugs
reach the American public.
This section will first consider the FDA's role as protector of the
public health and then address the public health advantages of RU 486.
The section will then propose changes in FDA policy that would ensure
agency adherence to its statutory public health role and prevent political
influence in the review of controversial products like RU 486. These
suggested changes in FDA policy focus primarily on limiting agency dis-
cretion, which allows political pressure to infiltrate the personal impor-
tation policy and in the new drug approval process in general.
In considering the need for change in this area, policy makers
would be best served by considering the French government's action on
behalf of RU 486. The French government's specific market-interven-
tionist technique does not provide a helpful lesson for the FDA, which
has neither patent law rights or ownership to use as leverage over Rous-
sel-Uclaf.20 0 Two aspects of the French government's action, however,
are useful in the U.S. context. The first is the French Health Minister's
stated goal to promote public health and eliminate ideological impedi-
ments to public health progress. The second is the French govern-
ment's ability to separate French abortion law, which places significant
restrictions on legal abortion, from public health concerns regarding the
availability of a safe and effective abortion method. These two aspects
of the French model can and should be integrated into U.S. drug policy.
If the suggested changes are effective, they will help eliminate arbitrary
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. United States patent law rights
do not depend on whether the patent owner exercises those rights. See Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. § 27(d)(4) (1988).
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government decision-making in drug application decisions and remove
the extra-market impediments that now block U.S consumer access to
innovative pharmaceuticals like RU 486.
A. The FDA's Role in Promoting Public Health
The Supreme Court has held that the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act's
"overriding purpose [is] to protect the public health." 20 ' Conse-
quently, a primary function of the FDA is to protect the public from
access to dangerous drugs. While the Act does not explicitly define the
agency's public health role, the legislative history of the Act reveals a
clear Congressional intent to protect the public from dangerous drugs.
Initial passage of the Act in 1938 and its subsequent amendment in 1962
were prompted by highly-publicized scares over the availability of dan-
gerous drugs. Public furor over deaths caused by Elixir Sulfanilamide
led to the passage of the original Act in 1938, which introduced the
requirement that a manufacturer prove the safety of a drug before mar-
keting.20 2 The 1962 amendments to the Act, requiring a manufacturer
to prove drug efficacy as well as safety, derived momentum from the
thalidomide tragedy in Europe. 203 The drafters of the 1962 amend-
ments sought to avoid similar situations in the United States. According
to one backer of the 1962 amendments:
Our duty, as I conceive it, is to make assurance doubly sure that we here
in the United States may never be the victims of a tragedy of the magni-
tude of the one associated with the use of thalidomide in Germany and
Great Britain. Whatever inadequacies now exist in legislation covering
this vital field must most certainly be taken care of promptly, so that we
may rest secure that the very medicines which hold out such bright prom-
ise of our ultimate freedom from disease do not themselves become a
cause of fear.20 4
Nevertheless, the FDA's restrictive role of keeping unsafe drugs out
of the market is only half of its public health responsibility. Equally
important is the FDA's responsibility to provide the public with access to
important new drugs. This theme was continually stressed in the floor
debate on the 1962 amendments. According to one of the supporters of
the 1962 amendments to the Act:
[W]hile we are charged with the responsibility of providing the Food and
Drug Administration with the tools necessary to protect the public and
prevent abuses and misuse of drugs in this country, we must also be fully
aware of the public welfare to the extent also that we do not act to retard
the development of drugs that are life prolonging or lifesaving. Thus
public welfare becomes a two way street; one which provides protection
from abuses on the one hand and the other which provides the continued
201. United States v. An Article of Drug, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
202. Dixie Farley, How FDA Approves New Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1987-Jan.
1988, at 10.
203. Id.
204. 108 CONG. REC. 21068 (1962) (statement of Rep. Fogarty).
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advantages to which the public is entitled through the research and devel-
opment of new and effective drugs. 20 5
Or, as another backer of the amendments stated: "Safety is, of course,
only one of our responsibilities in health matters . . . as important as
providing all possible assurances of safety, is our obligation to maintain
a legislative framework in which the benefits of new drug discoveries can
be brought rapidly to those who need them."20 6
This affimative role to promote public health is revealed in the
FDA's system for review of new drug applications. The FDA prioritizes
review of drug applications for products with the greatest "treatment
potential," which the agency defines as drugs that "may effectively treat
or diagnose a disease not adequately treated or diagnosed by any mar-
keted drug."20 7 Drugs that offer only a "modest gain" or "little or no
gain" are assigned lower priority in the FDA's review procedure. 20 8
B. RU 486 and Public Health
RU 486 is undoubtedly a strong candidate for FDA approval. While the
agency requires elaborate clinical data, 20 9 the drug has been the subject
of extensive international scientific scrutiny and has been generally
found "safe and effective"-the agency's standard for the awarding of
new drug applications. 2 10 Experts have found the drug to be as safe as
surgical abortion and to have advantages over that method.2 11 Thus,
RU 486 would not appear to pose any significant problems to the FDA
acting in its restrictive role of policing dangerous drugs.
FDA approval of RU 486 would facilitate introduction into the
United States of a drug with important public health advantages. The
FDA would thus. be faithfully executing its role as promoter of important
new medicines. The health advantages of RU 486 as an abortifacient
2 12
are significant because it provides a non-surgical alternative to what is
one of the most common surgical procedures performed in the United
States.2 13 There is evidence that RU 486 provides significant psycho-
logical advantages over surgical abortion and is less expensive.2 1 4 Med-
ical experts have described the drug as the most significant innovation in
reproductive medicine since the invention of the contraceptive pill. 2
15
Nevertheless, agency discretion and political influence render the
approval process problematic. 2 16 The FDA's broad discretion over the
205. 108 CONG. REC. 21057 (1962) (statement of Rep. Collier).
206. 108 CONG. REc. 21068 (1962) (statement of Rep. Fogarty).
207. Farley, supra note 202, at 12.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
210. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988).
211. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
212. For other potential uses of RU 486, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note I and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part III of this Note, notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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approval of new drugs allows politics to dominate scientific and health
considerations in the agency decision-making process. The import ban
on RU 486 reveals how abortion politics can influence the agency acting
within an area of its discretion.2 1 7 To ensure that politics does not bar
the availability of RU 486 or any other product with public health bene-
fits, FDA policy must be changed to curtail some of the agency's easily
abused discretion.
C. Changes to FDA Policy
1. Clarifying FDA Personal Importation Policy
One area of FDA policy that should be amended to safeguard public
health interests is the FDA personal importation policy, which now
enable U.S. citizens to obtain some foreign drugs that remain domesti-
cally unapproved. 218 The current policy is poorly designed and invites
arbitrary decisions.2 19 In the case of RU 486, the policy may have unjus-
tifiably deprived Americans of an important medical innovation. More-
over, it has certainly given the impression to drug companies and
consumers that the FDA is highly susceptible to political pressure on the
issue of drug availability. This section suggests changes to the current
personal importation policy that could reduce the likelihood of arbitrary
agency decisions and, consequently, reduce the harmful effects of drug
availability decisions. In addition, the changes should generally benefit
public health by facilitating consumer access to important foreign medi-
cal treatments.
a. Medical Conditions for Which Personal Importation is Allowed
The FDA's personal importation policy must be clarified to prevent
seemingly political decisions like the RU 486 import ban. As it stands,
the policy, which is broad and highly discretionary, 220 lacks clear guide-
lines and greatly increases the possibility of arbitrary decision-making
on the part of the agency. One section of the guidelines, for example,
refers to a "permissive policy" for drugs for treatment of a "serious con-
217. See supra Section III.B.3 of this Note, notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
219. Other FDA import ban decisions have been criticized. One example is the
agency's ban on the importation of THA, a drug used to treat Alzheimer's disease,
which is manufactured by Pharmoscience, Inc., a Canadian company. A small
number of U.S. Alzheimer's patients had used the personal importation policy to
obtain supplies of the drug from Canada in the summer and fall of 1988. In Decem-
ber 1988, the FDA placed an import ban on THA, stating that the drug was poten-
tially dangerous to the human liver. Up until the time that importation of the drug
was banned, families of patients reported that the drug was highly effective, and had
considerably improved the quality of life for family members with the disease. Critics
of the FDA's decision have since uncovered evidence that the agency may have not
been responding to safety concerns, but rather had been concerned that if the drug
was widely available in this country through personal importation, introduction of
the drug in this country would be slowed because fewer patients would agree to sub-
mit to the clinical trials required for new drug approval. WALL ST. J., supra note 160.
220. See supra Section III.B.3 of this Note.
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dition. ' ' 221 At the Congressional hearing on the RU 486 import ban, an
FDA official testified that the agency can apply these guidelines on a
"case by case basis" and that "discretion has also been used to allow
importation of unapproved drugs where the intended use of the drug is
appropriately identified, the use is not for treatment of a serious condi-
tion, and the drug is not known to represent a significant health risk." 22 2
The FDA has wide discretion in that it may rely on a serious condition
requirement for denying personal importation, but may also waive the
requirement.
If the serious condition requirement is to be a major factor in FDA
decisions to allow personal importation of drugs, the agency should
make this clear in its guidelines. In doing so, the agency should define
"serious condition" 2 23 and clarify the requirement that no "effective
treatment" be commercially available in this country. 2 24 In defining this
latter standard, the agency should specify how it would approach a con-
dition for which other treatments are commercially available, but are
more burdensome for the patient.2 25
In making its import ban decisions, the FDA should rely on the
advice of an expert panel to a greater extent than it does currently.22 6
This would both provide an outside check on political bias and guaran-
tee input from medical practioners most familiar with patient needs.
b. Import Ban
The FDA must also clarify the standard by which a drug is placed under
the "import ban" status. Currently the agency need not meet proof
standards for health or safety concerns before implementing an import
ban. Rather, the agency relies on its discretionary, informal guidelines
which, as in the case of RU 486, are highly susceptible to abuse. 22 7 A
new policy should include a standard of proof such as the "safe and
effective" standard for personal use of the new drug approval pro-
cess. 22 8 In addition, the new guidelines could require the agency to
make public the studies and other data that it uses to make its import
221. MANUAL, supra note 158, at 9-71-30(c).
222. Hearing, supra note 4, at 156 (statement of FDA Associate Commissioner
Chesemore).
223. Under a reasonable interpretation of the current guidelines, an unwanted
pregnancy may be a "serious condition." This would be particularly so if pregnancy
posed a significant health risk to the mother.
224. MANUAL, supra note 158, at 9-71-30(c).
225. Such a provision would clarify the Agency's position on drugs like RU 486,
for which there are commercially available alternatives to the drug (i.e., surgical abor-
tion), but which offer advantages over the commercially available option (in the case
of RU 486-decreased health risks, fewer side effects and increased patient privacy.
See supra Part I.B of this Note.)
226. See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the role of
French advisory groups, see supra Part 1I.A of this Note.
227. See supra Part III of this Note.
228. A higher standard might even be appropriate given the dangers associated
with personal importation.
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ban decisions, as it does currently in the area of new drug approval
decisions. 2 29
The agency should take further measures to ensure that a ban on
personal importation does not hinder research on use of an unapproved
drug. The policy could protect individual researchers from a personal
importation ban by ensuring a continued supply of the drug. This could
be done by exempting research-related importation from the ban. The
difficulties that researchers have had obtaining RU 486 since the import
ban might have been prevented by the FDA's clarification of its policy
with regard to the use of unapproved drugs for experimental
purposes. 23 0
Because the current import ban process is conducted entirely within
the agency, it provides certain parties, like Congressional insiders, great
access to the decision-makers, while the public, whose health motivates
the policy, is largely excluded from the decision-making process. This
inequity could be addressed by a statutory requirement that import ban
decisions be made only after the public has had an opportunity to be
heard, a requirement that could be implemented in either of two ways.
The first would mandate that import bans be promulgated under the
notice and comment rulemaking procedure; the bans would be imple-
mented only after the public, including the medical community, had an
opportunity to submit comments.23 1 A second statutory scenario, offer-
ing a greater degree of public participation, would require the FDA to
undertake formal rulemaking and hold public hearings on its import ban
decisions. 23 2 Public hearings would provide the agency with testimony
from various interested parties. Where appropriate, the statute could
enable the FDA to implement a temporary import ban under a desig-
nated standard of proof. Such a ban would prevent potentially danger-
ous importation during the decision-making process.
229. If, as may have been the case in the THA ban, the agency denies importation
when it may interefere with the new drug approval process -in the United States, this
factor should be clearly delineated in the guidelines. The agency should also be
required to prove sufficient grounds for this kind of concern.
230. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
231. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988). Notice and
comment rulemaking requires an agency to
(1) publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register
specifying the time and place of the rulemaking proceedings, the legal
authority relied upon for their issuance, and the content or subject matter of
the rules; (2) provide opportunity for 'interested persons' to comment on
the proposed rules by written submission and, at the option of the agency,
opportunity for oral argument'; (3) issuance, when rules are finally promul-
gated, of a 'concise general statement of their basis and purpose'; (4) provi-
sion, in the case of substantive rules, that they shall not be effective in less
than 30 days after promulgation.
BREYER & STEWART, supra note 182, at 562.
232. An amendment to FACA could require the FDA to review import bans under
the formal rulemaking provision of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1988). Congress might
very well find this public hearing requirement to be unduly burdensome, however.
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While stricter guidelines for the implementation of import bans and
a public hearing process would not eliminate behind-the-scenes lobby-
ing by insiders in Congress or the Administration, it could reduce the
potential for abuse under the existing vague and highly discretionary
policy. Clear standards for personal importation would give reviewing
courts greater ability to police agency decisions in this area. This is of
particular importance, for courts are often unwilling to interfere in deci-
sions resulting from broad agency discretion. 23 3 In addition, the public-
ity accompanying a public hearing could encourage accountability of
agency decision-makers. Clarifying and rewriting the current personal
importation guidelines will narrow the agency discretion that led to the
questionable RU 486 decision and thus prevent similarly arbitrary drug
availability decisions. Several factors, however, would render the adop-
tion of notice and comment rulemaking preferable to internal policy
guideline changes. Chief among them would be the opportunity for
public input. A public comment session would provide consumers,
medical experts, and others an opportunity to participate in the formula-
tion of the policy and would ensure that the agency consider a range of
perspectives before reaching a decision. A court might be more willing
to review action taken under a notice and comment rule than under dis-
cretionary internal policy guidelines. 23 4 Heightened review would limit
the effect of political bias on agency decision making.
2. Extending the Benefits of the Personal Importation Policy
In the interest of public health, the FDA should change its personal
importation policy to allow the importation of drugs such as RU 486,
which are only appropriately administered under highly controlled cir-
cumstances. Current guidelines require that the recipient of an
imported drug specify the physician under whose care they are receiving
the medication. 23 5 New guidelines could require that "imported" drugs
travel directly to a patient's personal physician and be administered in
accordance with specified agency procedures. This would expand the
options available to an individual seeking to import a foreign drug that
might require administration under clinical supervision. 23 6 Regulations
of this sort would significantly increase public health benefits by
allowing patient access to drugs like RU 486, for which the safety con-
cerns are a function of the administration of the drug rather than the
drug's effectiveness. 23 7
233. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
235. MANUAL, supra note 158, at 9-71-30(c).
236. Some cancer therapies require administration to a patient by a physician
under carefully controlled circumstances. Liability concerns might, however, result
in the refusal of many physicians to administer RU 486 before it is approved by the
FDA.
237. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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3. Safeguarding the New Drug Approval Process
The FDA's new drug approval process should be changed to ensure that
public health concerns, and not political issues, dominate the agency's
new drug decisions. These changes would not only facilitate approval of
RU 486 by the agency, but would be significant to the success of other
drugs as well.23 8 This section focuses first on general regulations that
might serve to depoliticize the new drug approval process. The section
then turns to the agency's discretion over the acceptability of foreign
test data and the safeguarding of this area from political abuse.
a. Congressional Clarification of New Drug Approval Standard
The FDA's statutory mandate under the new drug approval section of
the Food and Cosmetic Act (FACA) is broad and affords great discretion
to the agency.23 9 The problem with the current standard is not that it
specifically allows for political influence, but that the breadth of the
"safe and effective" standard lets the agency mask political decisions
behind "scientific" decisions. In the case of RU 486, despite the wealth
of medical evidence supporting the drug,240 the agency has great discre-
tion to pronounce it "unsafe" or "ineffective."
No statutory or regulatory change will eliminate political influence
from FDA decision-making. Nevertheless, a Congressional clarification
of the new drug approval standard might send a message to agency offi-
cials. By excluding political and non-scientific influences from FDA
decision-making, Congress would make clear its intention to limit
agency discretion. While the current standard introduced by the 1962
amendments to FACA gives the agency broad discretion to police new
drugs for health and safety problems, Congress now faces a FDA that
may be willing to subordinate public health to political concerns. Con-
gress could address this unanticipated development by passing legisla-
tion that would explicitly forbid the FDA from allowing politics to enter
its decision-making.
Clarification of the new drug approval standard might also serve the
important purpose of facilitating judicial review of agency decisions.
Courts have traditionally been highly deferential to FDA new drug deci-
sions.24 1 A standard that explicitly precluded political considerations
would provide a foundation for a finding of arbitrary and capricious
action under the deferential Overton Park standard of review.2 42 The
238. The Federal government in 1988 banned federal financing of research on
uses of fetal tissue. This does not bode well for the success of drug research that
might require the use of such technology. The use of fetal tissue is critical to current
research of Parkinson's disease. Similarly, drugs in the area of fertility control and
new reproductive technology could be affected by FDA bias. See PhilipJ. Hilts, Groups
Set Up Panel on Use of Fetal Tissue, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 8, 1991. at C3.
239. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 191.
242. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
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standard might also provide an additional incentive for agency decision-
makers to adhere to scientific considerations in new drug decisions.
b. Increased Role for Advisory Committees
While clarification of the new drug approval standard might facilitate
heightened judicial review of agency decisions, greater use by the FDA
of advisory committees might also provide an important internal check
on agency decision-making. An amendment to FACA providing for an
increased role of outside advisory committees would serve the same goal
as clarifying the standard for new drug approval; it would ensure that
scientific rather than political considerations dominate agency decision-
making.
In particular, FACA should be amended to require the FDA to con-
sult outside advisory committees earlier in the new drug approval pro-
cess. The FDA has in place a system of external advisory commitees,
which, at the agency's discretion, review products at the new drug
approval stage.2 43 A drug like RU 486, however, because of its contro-
versial nature, is likely to be referred to one of the FDA standing advi-
sory committees upon application. 24 4 But just as politics has affected
consideration of the drug at the personal importation stage, it might
affect appraisal of the drug before the new drug approval stage-at the
IND stage or at the approval stage of the Phase I or Phase II clinical
testing procedures.2 45 New regulations could establish a mechanism
whereby potentially controversial drugs would be referred to an advi-
sory committee at an early stage of the new drug approval process. The
regulations would also require the relevant advisory committee to
review the agency's preliminary decisions for scientific bases and moni-
tor the drug's path through the agency to prevent political delay or
sabotage.
The FACA should also be amended to require agency consideration
of the advisory committee's findings. A greater role for outside advisory
committees in FDA decision-making would bring the U.S. system closer
to the French model where the Commission of Marketing Authoriza-
tions plays an important role in new drug decisions. Like the French
Commission, FDA standing advisory committees for new drug approval
are comprised primarily of members of the medical community, includ-
ing practicing physicians who can provide the FDA with important infor-
243. 21 C.F.R. §§ 14.1(a)(1), 14.1(b)(2) (1991). Some drugs statutorily require
approval by an outside advisory committee. An example in such a category are drugs
that affect the health of pregnant women or that may have fertility effects. RU 486
does not fit in this category of drugs as it has been traditionally understood. It is not
a drug that, as an unintended side effect, affects the health of pregnant women,
neither is it a drug that affects fertility.
244. Either the standing advisory committee on fertility and maternal drugs or the
advisory committee on obstetrics and gynecology would appear to be appropriate.
See 21 C.F.R. § 14.10 (1991). For a list of all the FDA's standing advisory commit-
tees, see 21 C.R.F. § 14.10 (1991).
245. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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mation on the public health application of a new product. 24 6 Unlike
their French counterpart, 24 7 FDA advisory committees do not have a
clear statutory role in the decision-making process; the agency is not
required to consider the standing committee's views in its final decision
on the licensing of a new drug.248 An amendment that required agency
consideration of advisory committee recommendations would provide
for meaningful input from the medical community and would presuma-
bly ground FDA decisions in scientific findings. A statutory requirement
that the FDA consider its advisory committee's conclusions on any given
drug would also facilitate judicial review of the reasonableness of an
agency determination.
D. Acceptability of Foreign Test Data
As a result of funding and other constraints there is little ongoing
research into new reproductive technologies in the United States,
including new forms of birth control. 249 Thus, it is increasingly likely
that controversial medical innovations, like RU 486, will be developed
and marketed abroad. Consequently, the FDA's provisions on the
acceptability of foreign test data for new drug applications will become
increasingly important. As previously discussed, the FDA's standard for
acceptability of foreign test data is extremely. vague. 250
The FDA should amend its standards for the acceptance of foreign
clinical data to explicitly preclude political considerations; as this Note
has suggested, the new drug approval standard should be amended for
the same purpose. In addition, regulatory guidelines detailing accepta-
bility of foreign studies would provide greater assurance to foreign
pharmaceutical companies that applications based on foreign studies
will be treated fairly, and the agency will not employ broad discretion to
mask political decisions regarding foreign products.
E. Promoting the Availability of Important Foreign Drugs
Preceding sections of this Note have suggested ways in which the FDA
personal importation policy and the new drug approval process can be
safeguarded from political abuse to ensure the greatest consumer access
to medical innovations. Suggested changes to the new drug approval
policy would obviously affect the availability of domestic drugs (drugs
invented and tested by U.S. pharmaceutical companies) and foreign
246. FDA technical advisory committees, which include the standing committees
that review the NDA's for various products, may include consumers or industry mem-
bers, but only the technical members can vote. Joseph L. Lakshmann, Nontechnical
Representation on the FDA's Advisory Committees: Can There Be More?, 44 FoOD DRUG
CosM. LJ. 181, 185 (1988). Some critics of the system have suggested that the FDA
include more non-technical advisers on its panels. See id. at 186-89.
247. See supra note 57.
248. 21 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1991).
249. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text. See also note 154 and accompa-
nying text.
250. See supra note 145-47 and accompanying text.
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drugs (those invented and tested outside the United States). This sec-
tion focuses specifically on how the FDA can more aggressively
encourage the introduction of successful foreign drugs into the U.S mar-
ket. The section suggests that the United States adapt the French drug
development scheme discussed earlier in this Note,2 51 and implement a
similar system for (1) identifying successful foreign treatments and
(2) encouraging the marketing of such treatments in the United States.
Through either statutory amendment to the FACA or rulemaking
pursuant to the agency's authority to regulate new drugs, the agency
should create a drug-development body required to monitor foreign
medical developments for potentially important and beneficial innova-
tions. The body could consist of medical practitioners and scientists,
familiar with patient needs and current drug availability, who would be
able to identify foreign products that would provide treatments cur-
rently unavailable in the United States. The body's actions should be
carefully monitored to ensure that it consider "potentially useful" drugs
under a standard employing health and scientific factors and excluding
political considerations. Regulations could require that the outside
advisory group system be used to monitor the workings of the internal
drug development body and check for political abuse.
In addition, the drug development body could work to encourage
pharmaceutical companies or other sponsors of promising treatments to
seek FDA approval of their drugs. Consumer reliance on the personal
importation policy is a sign of the agency's failure to encourage the mar-
keting of promising treatments in the United States. Under a new pro-
gram to encourage drug development, U.S. consumers could rely on the
established channel for new medical innovations-the new drug
approval process-rather than turning to less reliable alternatives such
as the personal importation policy. Members of the new drug develop-
ment body could meet periodically with pharmaceutical companies and
assist in the development of test protocols and provide other assistance
to faciliate FDA approval of important innovations. This new relation-
ship between the agency and the companies would also have to be care-
fully monitored to prevent abuse and compromise of FDA standards on
behalf of a particular product.
Conclusion
The history of RU 486 in the United States reveals inadequacies in the
current drug approval system. These failings have damaging conse-
quences for public health. By allowing political bias to surround its
decision-making, the FDA has abdicated its statutory responsibility and
betrayed U.S. consumers. This Note has suggested that FDA policy
should be amended to safeguard the drug-approval process from polit-
ical bias at its various stages. Following the French example, the U.S.
government should act to further scientific progress, and protect inno-
25 1. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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vative and useful products from ideological forces. While the availability
of abortion is an issue on which not all can agree, public health should
not be held hostage to this moral debate. The FDA is obligated to assist
women facing unwanted pregnancies, cancer patients, and others for
whom RU 486 and other new drugs hold out hope; the agency is
required to help provide the best medical care that science makes
available.
The most effective way for the United States to ensure that its citi-
zens are not denied important medical advances is for U.S. government
leaders to adopt a public position of neutrality in public health policy, as
did their French counterparts. U.S. health officials through their words
and U.S. health policy through its actions need to affirm that scientific
progress is the "moral property" of all.
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